MNB Report on financial stability - November 2012 by Aczel, Akos et al.
REPORT ON FINANCIAL STABILITY 
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Financial stability is a state in which the financial system, including key financial markets and financial institutions, 
is capable of withstanding economic shocks and can fulfil its key functions smoothly, i.e. intermediating financial 
resources, managing financial risks and processing payment transactions. 
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank‟s fundamental interest and joint responsibility with other government institutions is to 
maintain and promote the stability of the domestic financial system. The role of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank in the 
maintenance of financial stability is defined by the Central Bank Act.  
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank facilitates and strengthens financial stability using all the tools at its disposal and, should 
the need arise, manages the impact of shocks. As part of this activity, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank undertakes a 
regular and comprehensive analysis of the macroeconomic environment, the operation of the financial markets, 
domestic financial intermediaries and the financial infrastructure, reviewing risks which pose a threat to financial 
stability and identifying the components and trends which increase the vulnerability of the financial system.  
The primary objective of the Report on Financial Stability is to inform stakeholders about the topical issues related 
to financial stability, and thereby raise the risk awareness of those concerned as well as maintain and strengthen 
confidence in the financial system. Accordingly, it is the Magyar Nemzeti Bank‟s intention to ensure the availability 
of the information needed for financial decisions, and thereby make a contribution to increasing the stability of the 
financial system as a whole.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analyses in this Report were prepared by the Financial Stability, Financial Analysis, Monetary strategy and 
Economic Analysis as well as the Payments and Securities Settlements Directorates, under the general direction of 
Márton NAGY, Director. The project was managed by Tamás BALÁS, senior economist of Financial Stability. The 
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OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
Financial stability heat map 
 
Note: Procyclicality is measured by the Financial Conditions Index 
(FCI), while resilience to shocks is approximated by the lowest value of 
three partial indicators (System-wide Financial Stress Index (SWFSI), 
Liquidity Stress Index (LSI), and Solvency Stress Index (CSI)). The 
methodological appendix contains a description of the index family.  
Source: MNB. 
Financial Conditions Index (FCI), real GDP and the output gap 
 
Note: The annual increase in the FCI shows the contribution of the 
financial intermediary system (banking sector) to the annual growth 
rate of real GDP. If the sign of the FCI is identical to that of the output 
gap, then the banking sector behaves procyclically. 
Source: MNB. 
Forecast of quarterly net changes in lending to the corporate 
sector 
 
Source: MNB. 
The financial intermediary system functions 
adequately if it is resilient to shocks and supports 
economic growth via lending. The resilience of the 
Hungarian financial system in terms of capital and 
liquidity is adequate, and has improved markedly 
since the last report. At the same time, the 
financial system is only performing its function as 
a financial intermediary to a very limited extent, 
as its low willingness to lend is having a strongly 
procyclical impact on corporate lending. Several 
risks have been identified in the external and 
domestic environment of the financial system, 
which are conserving this procyclicality and may 
weaken the current adequate level of resilience to 
shocks in the future. 
Credit conditions 
Mainly due to its subdued profitability, domestic 
banking sector is not supporting economic growth 
through lending. The current level of the Financial 
Conditions Index (FCI) suggests that the domestic 
banking sector is strongly procyclical. The FCI exhibits 
a highly negative value, while the output gap of the 
economy is also negative, implying that the financial 
system is contractionary, i.e. it exacerbates the 
economic downturn through the tight credit supply. 
This is mainly the consequence of weak banking 
sector profitability and the uncertain economic 
outlook. 
Tight credit conditions, particularly in the 
corporate segment, have led to a protracted period 
of subdued lending. According to the results of the 
latest Lending Survey, banks indicated further 
tightening due to lower willingness to lend rather 
than to deterioration in lending capacity (i.e. 
liquidity and capital position). In addition, subdued 
credit demand due to the drop in corporate 
investments and fading business sentiment point to 
further contraction in lending. Economic outlook has 
worsened as well, and thus the weakening cyclical 
position of the economy is leading to lower credit 
demand and consumption. Due to falling corporate 
profitability, loan portfolio quality is expected to 
deteriorate and risk costs to increase, which in turn 
may have an impact on pricing. Additional negative 
factors include the postponing of the reduction of 
bank levy and the raise of financial transaction tax. If 
the latter is directly passed on customers, it may lead 
to deterioration in corporate profitability; if it is 
passed on other services, it may lead to higher 
Procyclicality Shock-absorbing capacity
November 2012
April 2012
November 2012
April 2012
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2
0
0
6
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
2
0
0
7
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
2
0
0
8
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
2
0
0
9
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
2
0
1
0
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
2
0
1
1
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
2
0
1
2
 Q
1
Q
2
per centper cent
Output gap Real GDP FCI
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
2
0
0
8
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
2
0
0
9
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
2
0
1
0
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
2
0
1
1
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
2
0
1
2
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
2
0
1
3
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
2
0
1
4
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
per centHUF Bn
Forecast Actual Growth rate (YoY, RHS)
  5/79 
Forecast of quarterly net changes in lending to the household 
sector 
 
Source: MNB. 
System-wide Financial Stress Index (SWFSI) 
 
Note: The SWFSI covers the following sub-markets: spot foreign 
exchange market, capital market, secondary government securities 
market, interbank unsecured forint market, FX swap market, and the 
banking sector‟s stress index and correlation contribution. Higher 
levels denote higher stress. The correlation indicator of the SWFSI 
measures co-movements between markets. 
Source: MNB. 
Liquidity Stress Index, and banks’ liquidity surplus or deficit 
relative to the regulatory level in the stress scenario 
 
Note: The LSI is the sum of normalised liquidity deficits relative to the 
10 per cent level, weighted by the balance sheet total. The higher the 
value of the index, the higher the liquidity risk in the stress scenario. 
Source: MNB. 
borrowing costs. These factors point to a further 
marked contraction in corporate lending over the 
forecast horizon. In our estimation, the two policy 
rate cuts in August and September, amounting 50 
basis points, will probably only be able to offset these 
factors to a lesser extent. Consequently, corporate 
lending is unlikely to rebound till 2015. The 
persistently subdued corporate lending may lead to 
contraction in production capacity, which weighs on 
medium and long term potential growth. 
In contrast to corporate lending, household lending 
is prevailed by demand factors. Weak household 
credit demand is related to the uncertain income 
outlook and deleveraging of households. In the 
future, the role of credit supply factors may decline 
in the household market, mainly due to the fact that 
government-subsidised mortgage facilities have 
interest costs 4–5 percentage points lower than 
current market rates. This measure and the interest 
rate reductions by the central bank are expected to 
mostly offset the negative impact of weakening credit 
demand and high fiscal burdens on banks, thus our 
previous lending forecast has only been lowered to a 
small degree. The persistently subdued household 
lending is the result of the deleveraging of households 
stemming from the over-indebtedness, thus it is not 
considered adverse in terms of potential growth. 
Resilience of the domestic financial system 
There are no signs of turmoil on the key financial 
markets. For the purposes of financial stability, the 
government securities market, the spot foreign 
exchange, the FX swap and the interbank money 
market are considered as key markets. The backward-
looking System-wide Financial Stress Index (SWFSI), 
aimed at gauging stresses on these markets, is near 
one of its lowest values in the past four years. 
Banking sector liquidity also improved, parallel to 
financial markets liquidity. The banking sector has 
accumulated a substantial liquidity buffer, in order to 
comply with the short-term regulatory liquidity rule 
introduced in January 2012. The low level of the 
forward-looking Liquidity Stress Index (LSI), based on 
the short-term liquidity measure, implies that the 
liquidity buffer is adequate even in the occurrence of 
an extremely adverse shock. The longer-term 
structural liquidity position is also favourable. The 
majority of banks meet the 65 per cent regulatory 
requirement of the foreign exchange funding 
adequacy ratio (DMM) in effect since June 2012. 
Market participants complied with this requirement 
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Solvency Stress Index, and banks’ liquidity surplus or deficit 
relative to the regulatory level in the stress scenario 
 
Note: The indicator is the sum of normalised capital shortages relative 
to the 8 per cent level, weighted by the capital requirement. The 
higher the value of the index, the higher the solvency risk in the stress 
scenario. 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Five-year CDS spreads in the euro area 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
mainly by extending the average remaining maturity 
of external funds and FX swaps. At present, the 
dynamic outflow of external funds does not cause 
liquidity tensions as the appreciation of the forint, 
the decrease in FX swap exposure, and the longer 
maturities of external funding offset the negative 
effects. 
Banks’ capital position has improved further. The 
banking sector‟s overall capital adequacy ratio 
increased to almost 15 per cent at the end of June 
2012, due to the contraction in lending, appreciation 
of the forint and massive capital injections by parent 
banks. The system-wide capital adequacy ratio is 
nearly double the 8 per cent regulatory minimum, but 
capital buffers are extremely concentrated and 
retained earnings capacity is distressed. At the same 
time, the forward-looking Solvency Stress Index (SSI), 
which also takes into account the higher tax burdens 
of banks and the increased loan loss coverage ratio 
for non-performing loans than the current level, 
shows a low value, suggesting that the capital 
position of banks, and, consequently, the entire 
banking sector is adequate. 
Key risks 
The protracted euro-area sovereign debt crisis 
remains a key risk, despite the improvement in 
investor sentiment. Important progress has been 
made towards resolving the euro-area sovereign debt 
crisis: (i) the German Federal Constitutional Court 
ratified the European Stability Mechanism and the 
European fiscal treaty; (ii) the ECB announced a new 
bond purchase programme and (iii) the establishment 
of a European banking union is underway. Along with 
the Fed‟s new bond purchase programme (QE3), 
these steps greatly contributed to an improvement in 
global investor sentiment. Nevertheless, the situation 
of the periphery countries in the euro area remains a 
cause for concern. Several periphery countries are 
compelled to introduce stricter fiscal austerity 
measures, while their banking systems need 
substantial capital injections. However, not only in 
the periphery, but also in some of the core countries, 
major consolidation measures will be implemented. 
This may result in a significant deterioration in the 
economic outlook in the euro area, which in turn 
would generate additional pressure on European 
banks‟ balance sheets and profits, while investor 
sentiment might remain volatile. 
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Annual changes in key domestic macroeconomic indicators 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
External funds and net FX swaps of the domestic banking 
sector and branches 
0.  
Source: MNB. 
 
Ratio of non-performing loans and their loan loss coverage in 
the wider region 
 
Note: Numbers in brackets denote the reference periods of NPLs: 
1=2011 Q4, 2=2012 Q1, 3=2012 Q2. Data on loan loss coverage refer to 
2012 Q2 in the case of Hungary and the latest data for 2011 in the case 
of other countries, based on the EBCI Report. 
Sources: EBCI, IMF FSI, MNB. 
The outlook for the Hungarian economy is also 
deteriorating. Exports will continue to be the main 
driving force of economic growth over the next two 
years, but this growth is likely to be more moderate 
than previously expected, due to the weakening 
global economic outlook. Domestic demand is likely 
to remain subdued, reflecting protracted balance 
sheet adjustment by households and tight credit 
supply to companies. These factors imply that the 
Hungarian banking sector will also continue to 
operate in a very weak economic environment in the 
coming years. Banking sector profitability remains 
low, due to the deterioration in portfolio quality and 
high tax burdens, resulting in lower willingness to 
lend predominantly to the corporate sector. That in 
turn is likely to worsen the economic outlook through 
feedback effects. 
Outflows of external funds from the domestic 
banking sector continue at accelerated pace, while 
the reliance of the banking sector on the FX swap 
market remains high, despite some moderation was 
seen recently. Parent banks are characterized by 
twofold behaviour due to preservation of financial 
stability and deleveraging: while they are 
implementing recapitalisations (EUR 2.4 billion of 
injection since early 2009), they withdraw external 
funds to a larger extent from their subsidiaries (since 
early 2009, EUR 8 billion and EUR 14 billion outflow of 
parent bank and total external funds, respectively). 
The outflow of external funds continue at an 
accelerated pace, but due to the appreciating forint, 
decreasing FX swap exposure and the drop in CDS 
spreads, this has not led to liquidity tensions as 
opposed to end-2011. At the same time, the strong 
outflow of external funds, caused by the low 
willingness to lend of parent banks to their 
subsidiaries, may contribute to the deleveraging of 
the domestic banking sector. 
The ratio of non-performing loans is high in the 
domestic banking sector and the risk of insufficient 
loan loss coverage is rising. The high ratio of non-
performing loans does not pose a risk in all cases. 
The question is to what extent loan loss reserves 
cover expected losses. The higher the NPL ratio, the 
higher the required loan loss coverage, as a flood of 
collateral sales would induce fire sales. In Hungary, 
loan loss coverage remains low compared to that of 
other peer countries in the region. That is 
attributable to insufficient coverage for loans to the 
corporate sector, particularly for non-performing 
project financing loans. In the household sector, loan 
Actual
2011 2012 2013
GDP 1.6 -1.4 0.7
Export 8.4 2.1 6.9
Gross fixed capital formation -5.5 -5.9 0.0
Household real income 2.2 -4.0 -1.3
Household consumption 
expenditure 0.0 -1.0 -0.8
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Banking sector ROE in international comparison 
 
Note: Based on IMF GFSR data, calculated from consolidated after-tax 
profits. 
Source: IMF and MNB. 
 
 
 
Net interest income as a percentage of the balance sheet total 
in selected banking systems at the end of 2011 
 
Source: ECB CBD database. 
loss coverage for restructured mortgage loans is 
considered also low, but the gap appears to be small. 
The profitability of the Hungarian baking sector is 
distressed, representing a competitive 
disadvantage in the regional allocation of funds. 
The extremely low profitability this year reflects the 
bank levy and large one-off losses, in addition to the 
persistently high loan loss provisioning. At the same 
time, the interest rate margin of the domestic 
banking sector is relatively high in international 
comparison, implying that if costs decrease the 
Hungarian banking sector may regain its 
competitiveness in the region over the medium term. 
Looking ahead, two negative factors emerged in 
terms of profitability: first, the bank levy will not be 
halved in 2013, while the financial transaction tax 
rate will be doubled. Second, the risk of additional 
loan loss provisioning needs on outstanding loans is 
elevated. As a result, compared to our previous 
expectations the improvement in profitability will be 
delayed from 2013, with negative effects on lending 
and the real economy. 
At present, banks are attempting to partially 
offset rising loan losses by increasing interest rate 
margins, this, however, is not a sustainable over 
the longer term. In a regional comparison, the 
interest margin of the Hungarian banking sector is 
the highest. Rising interest rate margins imply higher 
debt servicing burdens for non-defaulted bank 
customers, which feeds back into the deteriorating 
portfolio quality and impairs consumption and 
economic growth. That may lead to the development 
of a negative spiral: the deteriorating portfolio 
quality and rising interest rates margins to offset 
them may reinforce each other, which deemed to be 
unsustainable over longer term. 
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Key risks: Risk mitigation measures: 
1. The protracted euro-area sovereign debt crisis 
continues to pose significant risks, despite the 
improvement in investor sentiment. 
 
1. Improving risk assessment of Hungary. In order to mitigate the 
impact of shocks from the euro area, improving Hungary‟s risk 
assessment remains crucial; to achieve this, prudent and sustainable 
fiscal policy and concluding an agreement with the EU/IMF is needed. 
2. Strong outflows of external funds from the 
domestic banking sector, while the reliance of 
banks on the swap market remains high, despite 
some recent moderation. 
 
2.1. Avoiding excessive outflow of external funds. Excessive outflow 
of external funds could be avoided by commitment of foreign parent 
banks related to the EU/IMF agreement, where they pledge to 
decelerate contraction in funding of subsidiaries . 
2.3. Mitigating risks stemming from large FX swap exposure. A 
voluntary commitment of banks initiated by the central bank would 
aim at capping banks‟ off-balance sheet open position at 15 per cent 
of total assets. 
3. The ratio of non-performing loans in the 
domestic financial sector is high, and there is 
increasing risk of insufficient loan loss coverage 
particularly in the case of project finance and 
restructured mortgage loans. 
 
3.1. Improving efficiency of liquidation procedures. The legislation 
and technical factors impeding efficient portfolio management should 
be reviewed with regulators, supervisory authorities and financial 
sector participants, with particular regard to the existing liquidation 
rules. 
3.2. Tightening of provisioning and collateral valuation rules. 
Stricter provisioning rules and collateral valuation should be 
considered, to ensure prudent provisioning. This may result in two 
responses by banks: they will either set aside higher provisions for 
non-performing loans or accelerate portfolio cleaning. Both responses 
would help to mitigate risks. 
3.3. The risk of insufficient loan loss coverage could be mitigated 
with a higher level of capital. Banks are able to manage this problem 
not only by additional provisioning, but also by higher level of capital. 
Currently, banks appear to choose the latter approach.  
4. Given the deteriorating portfolio quality and 
high tax burdens, banks’ profitability and 
retained earnings capacity may remain subdued, 
and in conjunction with higher risk aversion due 
to the worsening economic outlook this may 
translate into persistent constraints on credit 
supply. 
 
4.1 Improving work-out efficiency. Increase the efficiency of 
managing non-performing loans. 
4.2 Enhancing predictability of the regulatory environment. Crucial 
fundamentals for a turnaround in lending include reducing domestic 
banks‟ tax burden and ensuring predictable regulatory environment. 
4.3 Expansion of guarantee programs. Over the short term, it is 
necessary to expand the capacity of active guarantee institutions, in 
order to alleviate the procyclical behaviour of banks. This would allow 
for greater risk-sharing between banks and the state, making it the 
most efficient way of boosting corporate lending. 
4.4 Recourse to MNB’s lending tender. Significant easing of the terms 
on the MNB‟s tenders for two-year loans to support bank lending may 
be helpful. 
5. Banks are attempting to offset rising losses by 
raising interest rate margins, which is not 
sustainable over the longer term. 
 
5. Boosting price competition. Transparent pricing regulations on 
outstanding mortgage loans should be extended up to their maturities. 
That would mitigate the risk of negative spiral between the interest 
rate margin and portfolio deterioration by promoting more intensive 
price competition among banks. 
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1. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC MACROECONOMIC AND MARKET 
ENVIRONMENTS – Implementation of euro area crisis management steps is 
sluggish, while the domestic economic outlook is deteriorating 
Efficient management of the sovereign debt crisis and banking sector problems is a key task for euro area states. 
As part of this crisis management, the establishment of a European banking union was announced, while the last 
obstacle to the launch of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was also overcome. The ECB announced the start 
of unlimited government securities purchases in the secondary markets under certain conditions. As a result of all 
the above, market tensions eased considerably, which was also attributable to the announcement of the new 
quantitative easing of the Fed. However, risks in the euro area remain elevated; due partly to the feasibility of 
the timely and complete implementation of crisis management measures and partly to the challenges faced by 
southern countries to revive economic growth and to put government debt on a sustainable path. 
As a result of the improving global investment sentiment, the Hungarian risk premium dropped, and the liquidity 
of domestic financial markets improved. However, due to the euro-area sovereign debt crisis, the high net 
external debt of Hungary and the impaired potential growth, investors’ risk perception of the country remains 
extremely volatile. In addition to uncertain financial conditions, the weak performance of the economy and the 
worsening of prospects also pose challenges to the Hungarian financial system. In our view, an early agreement 
with the EU/IMF would contribute to a great extent to the mitigation of the vulnerability to external shocks. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of the financial and economic indicators 
of the ‘North’ and the ‘South’ (2008–2011, average) 
 
Notes: *As a percentage of GDP. **Basis points, average between July 
2011 and July 2012. 
Sources: Eurostat, Bloomberg. 
Chart 1: Annual change in GDP, the ratio of non-performing 
loans and the ROE indicator at end-2011 
 
Sources: IMF, ECB. 
Implementation of measures to contain the euro-
area sovereign debt crisis is slow 
The global macroeconomic and financial 
environment continues to be dominated by 
tensions from the euro-area sovereign debt crisis. 
The improvement in market sentiment attributable 
to the liquidity expansion by the European Central 
Bank (ECB) in early 2012 proved to be temporary. In 
the spring, in the case of Greece the perils of exit 
from the euro area and the suspension of lending by 
international organisations became palpable, and 
then in May Spain requested financial aid for the 
recapitalisation of its banking sector (including 
primarily cooperatives). 
Within the euro area, the divergence between the 
core and the periphery is increasing. The economic 
outlook for („southern‟) countries struggling with 
debt and balance of payments problems is 
deteriorating, while their funding positions are 
worsening (Table 1), making fiscal consolidation 
extremely difficult and affecting their banking sector 
more severely. A negative spiral between the state, 
the banking system and the real economy is 
becoming a real risk. Due to their banking sectors‟ 
considerable exposures in the southern countries, the 
creditor („northern‟) countries, with good economic 
fundamentals and extremely low financing costs, are 
also affected by these problems. 
There are mounting problems on both the asset and 
liability sides of the banking systems of southern 
Real GDP growth (YoY)
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Chart 2: Annual changes in euro area external funds (other 
than euro area) of banking systems and in the deposits of the 
private sector 
 
Note: „North‟: DE, AT, NL, FI. „South‟: GR, ES, IT, PT. 
Source: ECB. 
Chart 3: Average interest rate spreads (above EURIBOR) 
 
Note: Arithmetic average of corporate loans (below and above EUR 1 
million) and housing loans with maturities over and up to one year. 
Source: ECB. 
Chart 4: Annual changes in outstanding private sector loans 
 
Source: ECB. 
Member States. Due to the gloomier economic 
outlook, deteriorating portfolio quality is an 
increasingly severe problem, which – coupled with 
high funding costs – mainly impairs bank profitability 
in the periphery countries that are in a recession 
(Chart 1). Market funding is even more difficult by 
continued downgrading; Spanish and Italian 
government securities have moved dangerously close 
to the non-investment grade category, into which 
Portugal and Cyprus were already classified earlier 
(Greece is in the extreme speculative category). In 
addition to the costs, there are quantitative problems 
as well. Last year, external funding plummeted at a 
faster rate (by some 20 per cent) in the southern 
Member States, while it surged higher in the northern 
countries, due to flight to quality. In view of the 
deteriorating ability to save and the rising distrust in 
banks, collecting deposits is also a significant 
challenge (Chart 2). 
The problems of periphery countries are 
exacerbated by banks’ restrained credit supply. 
Interest rate spreads on loans and deposits1 increased 
to record heights in 2012 Q2 (Chart 3), while non-
price credit conditions also tightened. The decline in 
the high reliance on market funding, the still high 
funding costs, the stricter regulatory environment 
and limited internal capital accumulation all point to 
restrained lending. The accelerating decline in loans 
outstanding in the states hit by the debt crisis 
resulted in a decrease in loans outstanding in the 
euro area as a whole (Chart 4). 
In order to manage the escalating sovereign debt 
crisis and banking problems, EU Member States 
took steps in the direction of closer integration. 
Following the approval by the German Constitutional 
Court, the last obstacle to launching the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) was also overcome. This 
fund will have a lending capacity of EUR 500 billion2 
(capital amounting to EUR 80 billion and EUR 420 
billion of market funds with Member State 
guarantee). A part of the closer integration is the 
banking union taking shape (Box 1), in which the ECB 
would supervise the banking sector, with common 
bank resolution plans and deposit insurance in place. 
When the banking supervision is set up, direct 
recapitalisation of the banking sector of a given 
Member State will become possible. 
 
                                                 
1 A pass-through into deposits would be favourable for the profitability of banks, but increasing reliance on deposits results in strengthening 
competition, while inflation is above 2 per cent. 
2 An IMF credit line of a similar magnitude will also be added to the ESM funds, although half of that would also come from European countries. 
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BOX 1: SOME PRINCIPLES IN RELATION TO THE BANKING UNION 
Although the proposals for the Banking Union of the European Commission published on 12 September 2012 aim 
primarily at overcoming the current crisis of the euro area, they fundamentally affect the Hungarian banking 
sector as well.3 According to the ideas, the first step in setting up the Banking Union would be the creation of the 
so-called Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), in which the ECB would gradually take over the supervisory powers 
over all euro-area banks from 2013.4 The Bank Union may become complete in the coming years if (i) the Single 
Rulebook is adopted, and over the medium term with the setting up of (ii) a common, European resolution 
authority (which would be responsible for the orderly winding up of insolvent banks), (ii) a resolution fund that 
covers the costs of resolution and is financed from payments by banks and (iii) a common deposit insurance fund. 
Pursuant to the proposal, Hungary as a non-euro area Member State would initially not be a part of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism, although many Hungarian banks would still be involved. Hungarian branches of euro-area 
banks5 would be supervised by the ECB, whereas subsidiaries would be supervised by the HFSA and the ECB, 
within the framework of the group-level (so-called consolidated) supervision. The most important effect will be 
reflected in the international supervisory cooperation; while up to now the supervision of a larger banking group 
may have been the common „work‟ of even more than twenty European authorities, in the future only the ECB 
and the authorities of the „outsider‟ countries will be involved in the supervision. 
Although by itself it already means that international supervisory activity may be more efficient and smooth, the 
most important changes may be the aforementioned future elements of the Banking Union related to resolution 
and deposit insurance. Namely, pursuant to these, the burdens of any possible bank crises could be covered 
together, from the payments of the banking sectors of all participating countries, and the deposits would also be 
under common protection providing equal security. 
It is important that, within the framework of the so-called close cooperation, Hungary also may transfer the 
supervisory competence over banks headquartered in Hungary to the ECB, in case it undertakes by law to provide 
the ECB with the bank data and information necessary for supervision and also that the national supervisory 
authority (the HFSA in the case of Hungary) will follow the decisions and guidelines of the ECB. This accession, 
however, would only affect supervisory powers, i.e. if Hungary entered into close cooperation with the ECB, the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM)6 would still not be available for the recapitalisation of Hungarian banks (as 
Hungary has not paid any contribution to the ESM), as opposed to euro-area banks. 
It is the competence of the Hungarian government to decide to initiate close cooperation with the ECB.7 
However, at present even the negotiations about the draft of the EU regulation serving as the basis for the 
decision are still under way. Therefore, from a Hungarian point of view only general principles can be drawn up 
in advance. In any case, the framework desirable for Hungary needs to be assessed both for the scenarios of 
joining the SSM and staying out of it. 
Need for a balance of rights and obligations. The delegation of supervisory licences to European level would 
increase the credulity of the Hungarian financial system resulting in decreasing finding cost. It would also mean 
that domestic authorities would have less influence and control over the Hungarian financial system and, 
moreover, fewer means to control or manage any turbulences or crises. This may be offset if Hungary is also able 
to adequately influence the activity of the common supervision (for example, by participating in the decision-
making or if certain supervisory competencies may remain at local level).  
                                                 
3 The decisions of the European Council on 28–29 June 2012 and of the heads of state or government of the euro area on 29 June called upon the 
European Commission to elaborate a „road map‟ necessary for attaining a real Economic and Monetary Union. The pillars of this road map are: 
(i) the Banking Union (an integrated financial framework), (ii) an integrated fiscal framework, (iii) an integrated economic policy framework; 
and (iv) the strengthening of democratic legitimacy and accountability. 
4 Although the national supervisory authorities of euro-area Member States would keep certain competencies and the ECB would also involve 
them in the discharge of certain tasks, the ECB would practically perform all the important supervisory activities (regulation and control of 
capital requirement, certain macroprudential instruments, licensing, sanctioning, etc.). 
5 Several important banking groups, including, inter alia, Axa, BNP Paribas, Citi and ING, are present in Hungary with branch offices. 
6 The ESM is the permanent crisis management fund of the euro area. It may extend loans to its members, may purchase government bonds in 
the primary and secondary markets, may provide loans for recapitalisation of banks and it will also be allowed to recapitalise banks directly in 
certain cases. 
7 Obviously, with the adoption of the euro, Hungary would automatically enter the supervisory system of the ECB. 
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Keeping macroprudential policy at national level. According to the proposal, the ECB would be assigned not only 
the microprudential supervision of the banks concerned, but would also receive the powers related to the most 
important macroprudential instruments concerning these institutions (for example the counter-cyclical capital 
buffer). Although the principle that the Commission considers the euro area as one economic unit is 
understandable, exactly the current crisis made it obvious that in the present situation there may be 
considerable macroeconomic and financial differences even within the monetary union, and, for lack of 
independent monetary policy, only individual macroprudential instruments at the country level may be applicable 
to address local risks and imbalances. Obviously, this holds true even more for the countries that have not 
adopted the euro, such as Hungary, since these countries are at a lower stage of integration, and for them the 
maintenance of the powers of independent macroprudential intervention would be necessary even after 
establishing close cooperation with the Banking Union. 
Transparent and reasonable conditions of cooperation. If participation in the Banking Union becomes possible 
irrespective of the introduction of the euro, a further criterion is that the conditions and the process of joining 
should be unambiguous and clear. The draft of the Commission regarding the SSM is appropriate in this respect; 
the advantages and disadvantages of transferring the supervision can be assessed. At the same time, the 
conditions of joining the „complete‟ Banking Union – that comprises both crisis management rights and obligations 
– are not known yet. 
Ensuring a level playing field, minimisation of market distortions. The objective of the Banking Union is to 
strengthen the stability of the euro area and the European banking system. As such, it may make the 
participating banks safer if it works well, which, of course, may be a market advantage in the money markets and 
in the collection of deposits. Although greater stability and increasing competition by themselves are positive, all 
this may result in negative changes as well for the participants of the Single Market that are left out causing 
competitive disadvantage for them. Therefore, it will be important to create a regulation that will not jeopardise 
the achievements of the Single Market reached to date. The countries that opt out for a shorter or longer period 
of time have to continuously monitor whether a level playing field remains ensured, and if possible and 
necessary, they have to take adequate steps to prevent unfavourable structural consequences. 
 
Table 2: Securities purchase programmes of the ECB and the 
Fed 
 
Note: At average EUR/USD exchange rate during the given programme. 
Sources: ECB, Fed. 
 
 
In managing the debt crisis, the ECB announced an 
unlimited government bond purchase programme. 
Following the liquidity injections at end-2011 and 
early 2012, including the 50 basis point policy rate 
cut and the three-year LTRO loans amounting to 
nearly EUR 1,000 billion, the ECB was less active 
(Table 2). However, it became more active again in 
July, and reduced the base rate by 25 basis points. As 
a result, it does not pay any interest on its overnight 
deposit facility.8 In addition, the ECB announced that 
for certain individual countries above a certain yield 
level it was contemplating to begin unlimited bond 
purchases in the secondary markets (outright 
monetary transactions – OMT), provided that the 
given Member State receives assistance in 
accordance with the fiscal consolidation conditions 
required by the ESM and access to market funding is 
continuous. Thus, it can provide a considerable 
amount of additional funds to countries that entered 
the ESM and have limited capacities. 
                                                 
8 Due to the ailing interbank markets, however, banks that have surpluses continue to place liquidity with the ECB, whereas banks that need 
liquidity also resort to the central bank. 
Total 
amount
Bn EUR
Period Note
Government securities purchase 
programme (SMP)
209
05/2010- 
09/2012
On secondary market (no 
liqudity increase)
1. covered bond purchase 
programme
60
07/2009- 
07/2010
Held-to-maturity securities, on 
primary and secondary marktes. 
Planned duration 1 year
2. covered bond purchase 
programme
16
11/2011- 
09/2012
On primary and secondary 
markets 
Government securities purchase 
(Outright Monetary Transactions)
-
09/2012 - open-
ended
Unlimited purchase on 
secondary markets, conditioned 
on ESM loan
 QE1 -  GSE mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) and gov. 
securities purchase
1 223
09/2009- 
03/2010
From which gov. securities 
amounted to USD 300 bn. MBS 
principal repayments are 
reinvested till the end of 2012
QE2 - gov. Securities purchase 432
11/2010 - 
06/2011
"Operation twist" 290
09/2011 - 
12/2012
Switching from short term to 
long term securities in the Fed 
balance-sheet
QE3- MBS purchase -
09/2012 - open-
ended
Monthly USD 40 billion purchase, 
Open-ended
Fed
ECB
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Chart 5: Five-year CDS spreads 
 
Note: Arithmetic average of groups of countries.  
Source: Thomson Reuters. 
Chart 6: The European rescue fund and the problems of the 
countries hit by the debt crisis 
 
Note: Government debt data for 2013 are based on the spring forecast 
of the European Commission. 
Sources: EFSF, IMF, Eurostat and European Commission. 
Chart 7: Economic growth in international comparison 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Market tensions eased markedly as a result of the 
crisis management measures. During the summer, 
risk premium sank to levels prevailing prior to July 
2011, i.e. before escalation of the debt crisis (Chart 
5). This was attributable to the fact that the central 
banks of developed countries announced further 
quantitative easing. Due to the negative economic 
outlook, the Fed has launched its third quantitative 
easing programme (QE3), aimed at buying securities 
of USD 40 billion per month for an indefinite period, 
contrary to the earlier programmes. In addition, it 
will extend its ongoing programmes until end-2012. 
As a result, the total monetary easing will reach a 
monthly USD 85 billion in the next quarter. 
The emerging closer integration is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for management of the 
crisis. However, in addition to closer integration, 
another necessary condition in the euro area is that 
the southern countries succeed in putting their 
economic growth and government debt on a 
sustainable path. Nevertheless, crisis management 
measures and fiscal consolidation are accompanied by 
significant conflicts, while timely and complete 
implementations are surrounded by considerable 
risks. Amid restrained credit supply and protracted 
growth problems, there is an acute risk that further 
rescues may be needed, inter alia for Spain (Chart 6). 
Meanwhile, due to the mounting potential costs, 
investors may become uncertain about the debt 
sustainability of France and Belgium, which have 
weaker fundamentals than the core countries. During 
the summer, an outlook was changed to negative on 
the highest rating (AAA) of Germany, the Netherlands 
and the European Union itself. 
Deteriorating domestic economic outlook and 
external shocks are the major risks in Hungary 
The performance of the Hungarian economy, which 
has fallen into recession, lags well behind that of 
the region. In 2012 Q2, Hungary officially slipped into 
a technical recession, as GDP declined in two 
consecutive quarters. With this, the performance of 
the Hungarian economy was well below that of the 
region (Chart 7). The unfavourable GDP figure 
continues to be primarily attributable to subdued 
domestic demand due to deleveraging of indebted 
households and uncertain income positions, and also 
to subdued investment activity (Chart 8). By contrast, 
it is favourable that the balance of trade continued to 
improve and fiscal policy has remained orderly. 
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Chart 8: Investment and FDI as a proportion of GDP, 2012 H1 (4 
quarters) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Chart 9: Hungarian sovereign 5-year CDS spread and the 
decomposition of its change since end-June 2011 
 
Sources: Thomson Reuters and MNB. 
 
Chart 10: Breakdown of net external debt by sectors (as a 
percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: MNB. 
Slow recovery is expected, with deteriorating 
potential growth. Based on the MNB‟s forecast, the 
economic outlook continues to worsen; a 1.4 per cent 
fall is expected for 2012, whereas the earlier 
expectation was decline of a 0.8 per cent. A slow 
recovery with 0.7 per cent growth is expected for 
next year, which is slightly worse than the June 
forecast, but last spring the expectation was still 
twice as high with an estimate of 1.5 per cent 
growth. Due to weak domestic demand and the 
regulatory risks that make investor confidence 
weaker, investment activity will remain subdued, 
resulting in a further deterioration in potential 
growth. Since the September issue of the Inflation 
Report downward risks have emerged due to the 
higher tax burden on the banking sector, which we 
took into account in our lending forecast, but the 
growth effects are only quantified in the December 
Inflation Report. 
Risk premium declined considerably as a result of 
improving global sentiment. Highly volatile global 
risk appetite was reflected in the changes in 
Hungarian asset prices and the exchange rate of the 
forint as well. Following the initial deterioration 
after April 2012, during the summer the exchange 
rate of the forint and the CDS spread improved to 
relatively favourable levels (Chart 9), primarily due 
to global factors. The substantial difference between 
the Hungarian and regional CDS spreads has also 
narrowed since the latest report, which – in addition 
to the strong commitment to fiscal consolidation – is 
largely attributable to the commencement of the 
EU/IMF loan negotiations. 
However, due to the high external indebtedness, 
Hungary continues to be highly vulnerable to 
external shocks. The financing capacity of Hungary 
has improved considerably since the outbreak of the 
crisis. As a result, net external debt and gross 
government debt has been declining steadily (Chart 
10). At the same time, their levels remain high. 
Consequently, in the event of plummeting global risk 
appetite the country will continue to be vulnerable. 
An EU/IMF agreement may ensure favourable risk 
perception for a longer time and may further reduce 
the sensitivity of Hungary to risk premium shocks.  
In the external environment of the financial 
intermediary system, financial integration 
contagion and the deteriorating domestic economic 
outlook poses major risks. The weak Hungarian 
economy weighs on the portfolio quality of the 
banking system and amplifies pro-cyclicality of 
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lending. This effect is also enhanced by the funding 
costs, which are persistently high due to the euro-
area sovereign debt crisis, and by the deleveraging of 
parent banks, which may pose a risk even in the case 
of orderly deleveraging, if Hungary is 
disproportionately more affected by it (Box 2). As a 
result of the unfavourable external environment, 
there is a risk that the banking sector will not be able 
to support the economy, i.e. it will remain 
contractionary over the longer term. 
 
BOX 2: REGIONAL EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN DELEVERAGING 
Banking sectors in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region represent a significant share within the cross-
border exposures of euro-area banking groups. As a result of the relative geographical proximity as well as the 
harmonisation with EU legislation, significant exposures were or may have been built up in the region, which took 
place with considerable external funding in addition to domestic funds in the case of several banking groups. 
However, the escalation of the European sovereign debt crisis may entail a growing risk that deleveraging by 
euro-area banks may result in a sizeable reduction of exposures to the CEE region. One recurring conclusion of 
the corresponding studies is that the reduction may hit mainly those countries where the presence of foreign 
banks is relatively high and where banks are less independent in terms of funding, i.e. their reliance on external 
funds is relatively high. 
Our analysis attempts to identify the factors that influence the allocation decisions of individual banking groups 
concerning the region. In order to map the interrelations, the lending figures, reported within the EBA survey and 
mainly reflecting business plans, of banking groups operating in Hungary are used as dependent variables.   They 
are used in a simple regression analysis along individual characteristics by countries (forecasted GDP growth, CDS 
spread, geographical dummy variables) and affiliate banks (ROE and ROA indicators, loan-to-deposit ratios, 
interest margin). The advantage of this method is that individual relationships may be examined from a purely 
supply aspect (since that is reflected in business plans), and all of this can be examined by accounting for micro 
level characteristics (affiliate bank operating in a given country). The data of affiliate banks in the region of 
banking groups operating in Hungary were used for the analysis; the relevant financial and stock data for 2011 
were collected using Bankscope. 
With the combination of individual explanatory variables, we carried out OLS estimations, and then the two 
„best‟ specifications were selected, taking account of the significance of the parameters and the goodness of fit. 
Overall, the results coincide with the expectations: the higher the CDS spread, which presumably describes the 
perceived risk, in a country or the higher the reliance of the given affiliate bank on external funds (based on the 
loan-to-deposit ratio), the more sizeable exposure reduction can be implemented by the banking group in the 
given country. By contrast, high return on equity of an affiliate bank, or a higher-than-regional average net 
interest margin slows down the reduction of credit supply. 
The results are also suitable for a more thorough examination of various scenarios by using the estimations of 
studies and reports dealing with European deleveraging recently. These estimations are available individually as 
well for the various regions, but heterogeneity within a given region or individual impacts on countries cannot be 
examined separately. Making up for this disadvantage, based on the parameters of the estimated model 
specifications, we decompose the individual scenarios into individual lending effects of the different countries 
(however, resulting from the scheme, this still only relates to the lending of the banking groups operating in 
Hungary). 
The following scenarios are used for the analysis of the European deleveraging on the CEE region (in ascending 
order in terms of severity):9 
                                                 
9 The individual scenarios were published in: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2012; ECB Financial Stability Review June 2012; World 
Bank Deleveraging WP, June 2012. 
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1) IMF GFSR complete policies scenario; 
2) ECB FSR scenario; 
3) IMF GFSR current policies scenario; 
4) IMF GFSR weak policies scenario; 
5) One long-term scenario in the World Bank‟s publication entitled „Bank deleveraging‟. 
The above scenarios regarding the aggregated CEE region are decomposed into the changes in individual 
countries‟ exposures in the following manner: by banks and countries, on the basis of the estimated parameters 
the deviation of each individual characteristic from the group level average gives the deviation from the total 
regional average in terms of lending. The regional average varies among the individual scenarios. The sum of the 
changes in individual affiliate banks‟ exposure by countries represents the impact on lending in a given country. 
In the case of Hungary, for example, the baseline 
scenarios of the ECB and the IMF explain a 7–9 per 
cent decline in the credit supply of the banking 
groups under review (which is nearly identical with 
our own forecast), whereas riskier scenarios explain 
twice this much. Contraction in lending similar to 
that observed in Hungary can only be found in 
Bulgaria, but there it would materialise on a much 
lower overall exposure. 
Accordingly, in spite of the strategic presence in the 
CEE region, one cannot necessarily speak of a uniform 
treatment of target markets: in their allocation 
decisions, individual banking groups presumably 
distinguish between individual countries on the basis 
of the risk and profitability outlook; therefore, more 
significant heterogeneity may be observed within the region. In a regional comparison, risk premium and loan-to-
deposit ratio is also relatively higher, while profitability is weaker in Hungary. Accordingly, based on the 
estimations, an underweighting of Hungarian exposures can be identified compared to others in the region. 
Consequently, through the banking groups under review, an exacerbation of European deleveraging would be 
relatively more disadvantageous for Hungary than for other countries in the respective peer group. 
 
Chart 11: System-wide Financial Stress Index 
 
Note: The SWFSI covers the following market segments: spot foreign 
exchange market, capital market, secondary market of government 
bonds, interbank unsecured forint market, FX swap market, banking 
segment and the correlation contribution. A higher value means a 
higher stress. The correlation indicator of the SWFSI measures the co-
movement between markets. 
Source: MNB. 
Domestic financial markets remain fragile, but 
market liquidity has improved 
The stress level of domestic financial markets has 
improved markedly since mid-July.10 Starting from 
early 2012, liquidity tensions eased in parallel with an 
improvement in risk perception and appreciation of 
the forint. As a result, the System-wide Financial 
Stress Index (SWFSI) improved considerably (Chart 
11). Apart from minor temporary fluctuations in a 
positive direction, the stress level of the secondary 
market of government bonds, which takes account of 
credit and liquidity risks, improved as well. Hence, 
the stress level of the spot foreign exchange market 
improved markedly in May and June, and then 
remained practically unchanged in the subsequent 
period, and continues to fluctuate around the historic 
low of the past four years. Finally, the stress levels in 
                                                 
10 For more details on the SWFSI index see: Dániel Holló: A system-wide financial stress indicator for the Hungarian financial system. MNB 
Occasional Papers 105, 2012. 
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Chart 12: Changes in overnight, three-month, one-year and 
over one-year forint/foreign exchange swap spreads 
 
Note: Exponential moving averages are shown in case of the spreads 
with maturity of less than 1 year. 
Sources: MNB and Bloomberg. 
 
 
Chart 13: Outstanding amount of central bank EUR/HUF swaps 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
the interbank unsecured and FX swap markets 
improved amidst high volatility. As the indices of the 
individual financial markets did not show any 
systematic, permanent co-movement in the period 
under review (the correlation contribution indicator 
of the SWFSI11 remained stable or decreased in 
absolute value), the developments currently taking 
place in financial markets still cannot be considered 
significant in terms of systemic risk. 
Liquidity tensions eased slightly in the still fragile 
forint/foreign exchange swap market in the past 
half year. Since early 2012, the on-balance-sheet 
foreign exchange position and net swap exposure of 
the Hungarian banking sector followed a declining 
trend, pointing to moderating swap market tensions. 
Swap market tensions were eased by the fact that 
with the appreciation of the forint, the margin call 
requirement also declined. In addition to the 
improvement in the bid-ask spread indicator, this was 
mainly reflected in the decline in short-term FX swap 
spreads in the second half of the year (Chart 12). 
Longer-term spreads declined to a lesser extent. 
Spreads at shorter maturities surged only in mid-
June: non-resident players strived to reduce their 
forint assets exposure at the half-year reporting date, 
which is of key importance, and tried to invest the 
resulting available forint liquidity through FX swaps, 
which can be considered covered assets. In this 
period as well, the (negative) effect of price liquidity 
indicators (widening bid-ask spreads and deteriorating 
price-effect indicator) was offset by an increase in 
the number of transactions and in the average size of 
transactions. 
In parallel with the decline in market exposure, the 
use of the MNB’s FX swap facilities also dropped 
sharply. During the tensions of January 2012, the 
outstanding amount of the 3-month FX-swap 
instrument reached an all-time high of EUR 2,055 
million, followed by a steady decline since then 
(Chart 13). The 3-month FX swap facility has not been 
used since June 2012. There was no demand for 
central bank instruments due to the sound market 
conditions and the relatively high price. 
                                                 
11 The extent of correlation contribution can also be considered as a separate metric of systemic stress.  The smaller the co-movement between 
the segment stress indices (i.e. smaller segment cross-correlations than 1), the less systemic risk is present. When cross-correlations between 
the segment stress indices are smaller than one, the correlation contribution to the system-wide financial stress index is negative. If the 
system-wide financial stress indicator had been computed as a simple arithmetic average of the segment stress indices, then perfect cross-
correlations would have been assumed, which in less turbulent periods would result in overestimation of the system-wide stress level. The 
system-wide financial stress index (SWFSI) computed with the “correlation weights” eliminates this problem. Hence, the system-wide financial 
stress indices coincide with or approach each other only in situations when the stress trigger event is important from a systemic risk perspective 
(i.e. there is a strong, positive co-movement between the segment-specific risks). Correlation contribution = SWFSI with correlation weights 
minus SWFSI computed as a simple arithmetic average of the segment stress indices. 
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Chart 14: HUF/EUR exchange rate and the bid-ask spread index 
of the spot HUF/EUR foreign exchange market 
 
Source: MNB. 
Chart 15: Non-residents’ government securities and MNB bill 
holdings, and the five-year interest rate swap spread 
 
Sources: Government Debt Management Agency (ÁKK), MNB and 
Bloomberg. 
Chart 16: Turnover and interest rate of the overnight secured 
and unsecured interbank market 
 
Source: MNB. 
The liquidity of the forint/euro spot foreign 
exchange market showed strong co-movement with 
changes in the exchange rate in the past half year 
as well. During the exchange rate depreciation in 
April and May 2012, liquidity also deteriorated in the 
market, primarily reflected in an increase in the bid-
ask spread (Chart 14). As of 2012 H2, as the exchange 
rate embarked on an appreciation path, the bid-ask 
spread also started to narrow. In parallel, non-
residents built up a significant synthetic forward long 
forint position by means of spot and FX swap 
transactions, after taking the earlier positions of the 
opposite direction. 
The liquidity of forint-denominated government 
bonds improved slightly in H2. In 2012, non-
residents‟ share within the total outstanding amount 
continued to increase compared to the previous 
years: this share grew from 20–25 per cent at end-
2010 to 45 per cent by August 2012. As a result, non-
residents‟ government securities holdings increased 
to a record level (Chart 15). However, the favourable 
permanent effect on liquidity is mitigated by the 
strongly concentrated foreign ownership structure, 
which can easily amplify the effect of an external 
shock. 
Apart from a temporary downswing in July, the 
liquidity of the forint interbank market has not 
changed meaningfully. Domestic interbank market 
turnover did not change considerably for most of the 
period under review, and can still be considered low 
(Chart 16). In the past one year, the average size of 
transactions exceeded the multi-annual average 
observed prior to the 2008 crisis, whereas the number 
of transactions is below the pre-crisis historic 
average. The latter is mostly attributable to the 
decline in counterparty limits. Overnight interbank 
yields typically continued to stick to the lower bound 
of the interest rate corridor. However, in July 2012 
they approached the top edge of the interest rate 
corridor. The liquidity shock from the Single Treasury 
Account at end-July (primarily due to the payment of 
VAT and sector specific extra taxes, and partly due to 
the lack of experience caused by the intraday 
settlement launched in July) prompted banks to 
borrow larger amounts from the central bank 
temporarily, until end-July. 
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2. LENDING DEVELOPMENTS IN HUNGARY – Lending to non-financial 
corporations is driven by the procyclical behaviour of the banking sector; 
demand may rise in household lending due to the state interest rate subsidy 
The contraction in lending continued in both the corporate and household segments throughout 2012 H1. Although 
liquidity tensions, which have a negative effect on the lending capacity of the banking sector, eased on the supply 
side, banks’ decreasing risk tolerance became more pronounced with the deterioration in economic outlook. 
Accordingly, credit conditions were reported to have tightened in the corporate segment, while demand for loans 
also weakened in parallel with the economic downturn. As a result of demand and supply constraints, corporate 
lending in Hungary is among the weakest in Europe – with developments similar to the trends in euro-area 
periphery countries. Contraction in household loans outstanding continued as well, following the early repayment 
scheme, attributable to the persistently tight credit conditions which evolved during the early repayment scheme 
and the further inevitable deleveraging of indebted households. Although an easing of the strict credit conditions 
started in Q2, households’ demand for loans remained very subdued. As regards the households, one positive 
development is that a further easing of credit conditions and an increase in credit supply can be expected due to 
the state interest rate subsidy scheme. 
Given the deteriorating economic outlook, the rising tax burden on banks and the persistently tight credit 
conditions, a downward revision was carried out in the forecast for corporate lending: a 5.3 per cent fall in 2013 
and a further 4.1 per cent decline in 2014 is expected in the outstanding loans of domestic financial 
intermediaries. In the household segment, the joint result of subdued demand for loans and the rising tax burden 
is expected to be partially offset by the positive effects of the interest rate subsidy and policy rate cuts. 
Accordingly, a modest revision was carried out in household lending forecast compared to the expectations 
published in September. Loans outstanding are expected to decline by 3.4 per cent and 2.0 per cent in 2013 and 
2014, respectively. No significant increase is expected in either sector before 2015.  
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 17: Net quarterly changes in domestic corporate loans 
outstanding 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strong procyclical behaviour of banks pertains 
particularly to corporate lending 
No material improvement has been seen in 
corporate lending. The trends observed earlier in 
corporate lending continued in 2012 H1. Contraction 
in loans outstanding continues to be driven by the 
decline in long-term (foreign currency) loans, which 
have not grown since end-2008. Expansion in short-
term loans continues to be occasional, increasing 
only in some quarters since the crisis (Chart 17). 
Corporate lending in Hungary is among the 
weakest in international comparison. Developments 
in corporate lending in Hungary relative to other 
countries in the region remained unchanged 
compared to end-2011. Corporate loans expanded 
dynamically in most of the countries of the region, 
with the exception of stagnation in Slovakia, but the 
overall decline since the onset of the crisis in 
Hungary is a clear exception in this respect (Chart 
18). Similar developments in lending have been 
observed in euro-area periphery countries. 
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Chart 18: Corporate lending in international comparison 
(October 2008 = 100 per cent) 
 
Sources: Statistics of national central banks. 
Chart 19: Net annual changes in external financing to the 
corporate sector 
 
Source: MNB. 
Chart 20: Changes in manufacturing production and in short- 
and long-term loans to the sector (2005 = 100 per cent) 
 
Source: MNB. 
Substitution with external financing is still not 
common. For the domestic corporate sector, cross-
border lending could function as an alternative to 
domestic financial intermediaries. In 2011, the loans 
borrowed from both foreign lenders and parent 
companies declined in the corporate sector, although 
the latter increased mildly in 2012 H1 (Chart 19). 
Accordingly, domestic companies are not typically 
replacing the lacking domestic financing with foreign 
loans, except at a limited number of large 
enterprises. 
Credit demand is declining due the drop in 
industrial production, along with persistently 
subdued investment activity. A duality continues to 
be observed in developments in corporate 
investments: most of the sectors are characterised 
by extremely weak underlying circumstances, which 
is only mitigated by some key investment in 
manufacturing. Due to this low level of investment, 
demand for long-term corporate loans remains 
subdued. At the same time, in parallel with the 
deterioration in external demand and economic 
outlook, industrial production also declined. The 
decrease in production results in a further 
postponement of investment decisions as well as in a 
decline in demand for short-term loans financing 
working capital. 
A marked slowdown in production and a decline in 
borrowings have been observed in manufacturing 
as well. A drop in the production of manufacturing, 
which is of key importance in the Hungarian 
economy, was recorded in two successive quarters in 
2012, which is unprecedented since 2009. This took 
place in spite of the fact that some earlier 
automotive projects launched production in 2012 H1. 
In the case of a permanent weakening in the activity 
of the whole sector, a continued decline in long-
term loans is expected, while a fall in outstanding 
short-term loans is observed in parallel with the 
downturn in production (Chart 20). 
Tighter opportunities for alternative financing are 
leading to rising demand for short-term bank 
credit. In parallel with the gradually declining long-
term lending, the outstanding amount of short-term 
loans has also dropped substantially since the onset 
of the crisis. The overall decrease in this loan type 
amounts to 20 per cent on average, with the largest 
declines recorded in the manufacturing, trade and 
transport sectors. In contrast to long-term loans, 
however, short-term financing is not declining 
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Chart 21: Outstanding amount of corporate loans with 
breakdown by maturities (October 2008 = 100 per cent) 
 
Source: MNB. 
Chart 22: Contribution of individual factors to banks’ credit 
conditions in the corporate segment 
 
Source: MNB lending survey. 
Chart 23: The role of economic prospects and industry specific 
problems in the changes in corporate credit conditions 
 
Sources: CSO and MNB lending survey. 
steadily; moreover the respective outstanding 
amount of short-term loans has increased moderately 
since mid-2010 (Chart 21). This may be explained by 
rising demand for short-term loans. Since the 
availability of long-term credit has shrunk (including 
the roll-over of short term loans as well) and so has 
trade credit, it can be assumed, that non-financial 
corporations, including SMEs in particular, are 
increasingly reliant on short-term bank loans. Thus, 
easing credit conditions in this segment is of 
outstanding importance. 
The lending capacity factors eased on the supply 
side. At end-2011, banks indicated a broad-based 
tightening of credit conditions in the bank lending 
survey; the underlying reasons were mainly the 
capital and particularly the liquidity position, which 
are the determinants of lending capacity. In 2012, 
the contribution of these factors abated, especially 
on the liquidity side: the appreciation of the forint 
and the decline in swap and CDS spreads may have 
resulted in an improvement in lending capacity 
(Chart 22). 
Risk tolerance continues to decline as the 
economic outlook worsens. The deteriorating 
economic outlook affects banks: similarly to the 
findings of the euro-area lending survey, the 
tightening in credit conditions was mainly 
attributable to cyclical factors related to the 
deteriorating economic environment (Chart 23). 
Accordingly, the improvement in lending capacity 
was essentially offset by a decline in willingness to 
lend, resulting in a further tightening in credit 
conditions. Domestic banks have been steadily 
tightening credit conditions in the corporate 
segment, and have indicated further tightening for 
2012 H2 as well. In view of the further tightening, 
the risk of credit crunch remains elevated. 
Financial intermediaries’ deleveraging continues to 
significantly impact the real economy; an 
expansion of guarantee undertakings could mitigate 
this problem over the short term. Although the 
Financial Conditions Index (FCI) covers lending 
developments as a whole, it also allows for 
conclusions to be drawn regarding the state of 
corporate lending as well. The FCI index shows the 
extent of the contribution of financial conditions to 
the annual real GDP growth rate between 2002 Q2 
and 2012 Q2. The financial intermediary sector 
contributed significantly to the economic downturn 
after 2008. When it bottomed out, the annual 
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Chart 24: Financial Conditions Index (FCI), real GDP and the 
output gap 
 
Note: The annual increase in the FCI shows the contribution of the 
financial intermediary system (banking sector) to the annual growth 
rate of real GDP. If the sign of the FCI is identical to that of the output 
gap, then the banking sector behaves procyclically. 
Source: MNB. 
contraction in real GDP was 8 per cent, about half of 
which was caused by the financial sector. In 2010, the 
real economy slowly started to grow again, but the 
banking system restrained this expansion, and the 
procyclical behaviour of the financial system is 
contributing significantly to the current recession as 
well (Chart 24). However, despite the present tight 
supply conditions, the situation still cannot be 
considered as a „credit crunch‟; in any case, the 
easing of supply constraints would be desirable in 
terms of growth. The recurring conclusion of the 
Financial Stability Reports is that the most efficient 
way to mitigate supply contraction over the short 
term is to expand the guarantees undertaken by the 
state (Box 3). Over the longer term, however, the 
profitability of the banking sector must be restored. 
 
BOX 3: THE ROLE OF CREDIT GUARANTEE IN CORPORATE LENDING12 
The largest participant in granting guarantees with state counter guarantee in Hungary is Garantiqa Zrt., with a 
market share of nearly 90 per cent. Between 2007 and 2011, it undertook joint and several guarantees for an 
average 20,000 small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) annually, for new loans amounting to HUF 270 billion, 
of which 80–85 per cent were short-term loans. Garantiqa Zrt. undertakes joint and several guarantees for a 
maximum 80 per cent of loans for an annual guarantee fee of 1.5–2.2 per cent, and at present 85 per cent of the 
portion covered by guarantee is counter guaranteed by the Hungarian State. With this, the banks‟ expected loss 
(EL)13 on the guaranteed portfolio ceteris paribus declines considerably due to the drop in loss given default 
(LGD). The declining risk costs and lower capital needs due to guarantee may jointly result in an increase in the 
credit supply of banks (credit rationing eases). 
The probability of default14 (PD) of the loans entering the portfolio of Garantiqa Zrt. in 2010 was 5.5 per cent on 
average, on the basis of the estimate we used.15 Both the level and distribution are similar to banks‟ total 
outstanding new non-guaranteed SME loans. At the same time, based on the budgetary counter guarantees drawn 
in the years of the crisis and the collection revenues paid to the budget, the loss given default would be around 
90 per cent without guarantee.16 Based on the above, the 4.5–5 per cent loss given default of the guaranteed 
portfolio is much higher than the around 3.5 per cent level for the banking sector‟s total outstanding corporate 
loans, and thus, overall, the guaranteed portfolio is riskier, which is natural as well, because with this it is able 
to ease credit rationing and act in counter-cyclical manner. 
The characteristics of companies that have credit guarantee (as well) also indicate that these companies are 
riskier than the ones that do not have a guarantee. Based on logit estimate (where the dependent variable is that 
the company has a guarantee (as well) or not), less liquid, smaller companies that depend on domestic markets 
and have fewer tangible assets will have a guaranteed loan with a higher probability. In addition, the probability 
of a guarantee is higher with a greater amount of long-term liabilities, whereas its probability is lower if the 
amount of receivables and short-term liabilities is greater.17 
                                                 
12 Guarantees provided  to individual entrepreneurs are not included in data within the box. 
13 Expected loss is the product of the probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD): EL=PDxLGDxEAD. 
14 In addition to bank scoring, clients are also subject to screening by Garantiqa during the judgement of the credit guarantee. 
15 For more details see Box 5. 
16 However, the LGD approximated this way is presumably distorted upwards: firstly, in the case of a guarantee, the given SME does not 
necessarily want to offer any collateral; secondly, the debt is typically collected by the creditor bank, while the incentives of efficient 
collection are weak because of the joint and several guarantee. 
17 Higher amounts of receivables and short-term liabilities may capture the degree of integration (wider range of suppliers and sellers). 
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At the same time, the conclusion that clients that have a credit guarantee are riskier does not mean that these 
companies cannot receive commercial bank loans without a credit guarantee. Indeed, the ratio of companies that 
have only guaranteed loans is barely 5 per cent of all companies with guaranteed loans. The remaining 95 per 
cent of companies have access to both normal 
commercial bank loans and guaranteed loans as well: 
in the case of companies that have a guarantee (as 
well), the proportion of guaranteed loans was around 
an average 40 per cent of the contract value of new 
loans between 2007 and 2010. All of this means that 
where lending would have materialised without a 
guarantee as well, the given company received more 
credit with the guarantee. 
Taking account of the result concerning the loss given 
default and the offered interest rate conditions of 3 
large banks, the average offered rate of SMEs 
belonging to the guaranteed portfolio would be around 
12 per cent without a guarantee, disregarding other 
fees and the profit margin. Of this, the reference rate 
is around 6.5 per cent, the credit risk premium is around 4.5–5 per cent and the cost of capital is about 1–1.5 per 
cent. At the same time, the joint and several guarantee provided with state counter guarantee translates into a 
decline in the credit risk premium due to a lower potential loss for the bank, while the cost of capital decreases 
as a consequence of the lower risk weights of state counter guarantee. Accordingly, the average borrowing rate 
of an SME belonging to the guaranteed portfolio declines from around 12 per cent to 10 per cent, taking account 
of the 1.5–2 per cent 
guarantee fee as well. 
In summary, our findings 
show that on the basis 
of their probability of 
default (PD) the 
overwhelming majority 
of companies that have 
a guarantee are 
creditworthy at 
commercial banks, but they can satisfy their total loan demand only if there is credit guarantee, presumably 
because of their increasing risks due to higher indebtedness and because of the insufficient collateral they have. 
It is important to note that if companies‟ total loan demand was satisfied even without a credit guarantee, a 
credit guarantee could still have a positive impact: namely, banks‟ credit supply would increase as a result of the 
cost reduction achieved, but for another clientele. For lack of individual interest rate and collateral data, real 
economy effects are difficult to estimate, so we assumed two scenarios: in the first case, no new lending would 
have taken place without credit guarantees (upper estimate), whereas in the second case the riskier half of the 
new contracts of Garantiqa (the part to the right from the peak of the PD distribution) does not receive 
guaranteed loans. Of the above, the latter is considered the reasonable scenario. If it had taken place, corporate 
loans outstanding would have declined by 1.7–2.1 per cent in a given year during the crisis, which – using the 
findings of Tamási – Világi (2011)18, namely that 1 per cent decrease in credit supply results in 0.2 per cent drop 
in GDP – would have resulted in an 0.3–0.4 per cent lower GDP in real terms (cumulatively around 1 per cent in 3 
years). 
                                                 
18 Tamási – Világi (2011) identify loan supply shocks using a SVAR model, suggesting that a 1 per cent decline in corporate loans outstanding 
results in an 0.2 per cent fall in GDP. For more details see: Tamási, B. – Világi, B. (2011): Identification of credit supply shocks in a Bayesian 
SVAR model of the Hungarian economy. MNB WP. 
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Concerning the impact of credit guarantees on the economy, findings in international literature are also clearly 
positive (World Bank 2012).19 Guarantees resulted in higher loans outstanding in the SME segment, and also 
reduced credit rationing (Crowing, 2010). In Canada, based on the findings of Riding et al. (2010), 75 per cent of 
companies would not have received loans. According to the calculations of Uesugi et al. (2010), in Japan (where 
some of the loans materialise even without a guarantee), for a given year, credit guarantees resulted in 2–3 
percentage points higher loans outstanding as a proportion of balance sheet total. According to the calculations 
of Schmidt et al. (2010), in Germany, without guaranteed loans (all loans do not materialise without guarantee), 
corporate loans outstanding would have declined by 0.3 per cent in a given year, resulting in an 0.1 per cent 
lower GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 25: The number of borrowing companies in the given year 
 
Source: Central Credit Information System. 
 
 
In addition to demand and supply factors, the 
changing composition of potential borrowers also 
influences developments in lending. Steady 
tightening in supply was observed since the crisis, 
and the analysed micro data also show that fewer 
companies borrowed than prior to the crisis (Chart 
25). This, however, reflects not only demand and 
supply factors. Changes in the macroeconomic 
environment may also entail fundamental changes in 
the default risk and creditworthiness of companies. 
If economic activity rebounds, the net value of 
companies increases, and in parallel with that their 
creditworthiness also improves. Accordingly, if 
supply conditions remain unchanged, the number of 
companies that can borrow increases, i.e. ceteris 
paribus lending also expands. In a recessionary 
environment the opposite occurs: the economic net 
value of companies declines, i.e. creditworthiness 
deteriorates, and the number of companies with 
access to credit declines. Accordingly, a contraction 
in lending is expected due to the changing 
composition of companies as well, although it is not 
certain at all that banks actually lend only to better-
quality clients (Box 4). 
BOX 4: DECOMPOSITION OF THE DEFAULT RISK OF CORPORATE LOANS 
In the analysis of credit markets, in addition to the lending rate, the default risk of companies with credit 
demand fundamentally influences lending. Therefore, in order to understand lending it is of utmost importance 
to take into account changes in credit risks. The data of the Central Credit Information System (CCIS) allow the 
analysis of the changes that took place in default risk of borrowers. Upon evaluation of loan applications, banks 
typically use scoring systems primarily based on corporate balance sheets and profit and loss statements. Within 
that, they assess the default risk of companies on the basis of various corporate characteristics (such as size, 
profitability, etc.), and loans can only be extended above a pre-determined score (cut-off point). When banks 
tighten their non-price credit conditions, it typically implies raising the score threshold of access to loans. 
                                                 
19 For more details see: World Bank (2012) Global Financial Development Report. Riding et al. (2007): Incrementality of SME loan Guarantees. 
Small Business Econ. Schmidt et al. (2010): Quantification of the macroeconomic effects of the activities of German Guarantee Banks under the 
framework conditions of the global financial and economic crisis. Cowling, M. (2010): The role of loan guarantee schemes in alleviating credit 
rationing in the UK.  J. of Fin. Stab.  Uesugi et al. (2010): The effectiveness of public guarantees in the Japanese loan market. J. of the 
Japanese and intl. econ. 
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Using the data of borrowing companies, we prepared 
a score estimate for the 2007–2011 period, similar to 
banks‟ scoring models. The result variable of the logit 
estimate is companies‟ probability of default within 
one year. Its explanatory variables are the following: 
total liabilities, liquid assets and sales revenue as a 
proportion of the balance sheet total, profit after tax 
and dividends as a proportion of the sales revenue, 
the logarithm of the balance sheet total, whether the 
given company is an SME, it has export sales revenue, 
and finally the denomination of its loan. The effect of 
the changes in the macroeconomic environment was 
measured by separate variables (year dummies). The 
effect of the behaviour of banks (which we called 
supply effect) and the effect of the changes in 
macroeconomic prospects (composition effect) appear simultaneously in the comparison of the probabilities of 
default of pre-crisis and post-crisis new loans. The composition effect means that, with unchanged individual-
level corporate characteristics, the macroeconomic environment has a relevant impact on the probability of 
default of all the companies at the whole economy level, and through that on the number of creditworthy clients 
as well. If the supply and composition effects are separated,20 it can be stated that of the factors that have an 
impact on the probability of default, in the post-crisis period the latter significantly increased the probability of 
default of companies, and thus a considerable deterioration took place in the risk of loans extended. 
The next chart in the box shows the amount of loans 
that the banking sector would have been able to 
extend in each year at a given average risk, based on 
the estimated probabilities of default. The last point 
of the lines for a given year always shows the new loan 
volumes for that year and its average risk weighted 
with the loans outstanding.21 The increase in risk 
stemming from the deterioration in the general 
macroeconomic environment is measured by the 
composition effect; it is apparent that this factor was 
crucial in the change of the probability of default. The 
supply effect shows that banks‟ lending capacity 
(capital and liquidity constraints), willingness to lend 
(risk aversion) as well as their reaction to the changes 
in the macroeconomic environment and in demand 
(their behaviour stemming from profit maximisation) together skewed lending towards a lower probability of 
default, i.e. tighter credit conditions (which is in line with the findings of the lending surveys conducted by the 
Bank).22 Given the deterioration in the economic outlook, the pre-crisis volume of new loans could have been 
extended following the outbreak of the crisis only with a significantly higher probability of default (PD): if the 
banking sector had undertaken the same average risk in 2011 as in 2007, new loan volumes would have been 
approximately half of the actually extended one and one third of the lending in 2007. 
                                                 
20 It means the disregarding of the effect of the year dummy. Composition effect in this case means the joint effect of two types of 
compositions. On the one hand, given the change in the macroeconomic environment, the distribution of the total set of corporations according 
to risk changed. On the other hand, compared to that, of all the companies the risk of those that have a demand for loans may have changed in 
another way. The data do not allow the separation of these two effects. 
21 Given the lack of a demand curve, we do not have information on the risk of a greater loan volume than the one that has taken place. We do 
not have estimates for output with the assumption of an unchanged macroeconomic environment either. We can only quantify the effect of the 
change in composition on the risk; accordingly both lines for 2011 show the amount actually lent. 
22 Various shocks may have different impacts on the probability of default and on the amount of loans extended. Therefore, the composition and 
supply effects mentioned here may appear with different ratios in the amount of loans extended than in the risk. The decomposition used here 
cannot be compared with the demand-supply decomposition in lending either. 
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The sectoral breakdown of the 
company default risk and the 
change in lending shows 
considerable heterogeneity. 
Deterioration in the 
macroeconomic environment 
increased the probability of 
default in each sector, 
although to different extents. 
The impact of the change in 
supply on the probability of 
default varies across sectors 
even in terms of its sign. 
Positive effects can be 
observed in those two sectors 
where the composition effect 
increased the probability of default to the largest degree. Presumably, this phenomenon is attributable to banks‟ 
forced lending. With the increase in risks, the volume of new loans fell in each sector (with one exception), most 
significantly in Construction and in the sector of Real estate transactions, financial and insurance activity, which 
is closely related to the former. It is also evident that the impact of tighter credit conditions on lending varies 
across sectors: in spite of the fact that the greatest tightening (the greatest supply effect in absolute terms) 
occurred in loans to manufacturing, the fall in the volume of new loans was the smallest in this sector. 
Banks may react in three ways to the risks stemming 
from the composition effect: they do not lend to 
companies that were considered creditworthy before 
(they tighten credit conditions), they lend to 
companies at higher interest rates, or they lend with 
shorter original maturity, reducing the default risks. 
The extent of the first reaction is shown by the supply 
effect. Interest rate spreads also increased in the 
period under review, but interest rate hikes can only 
be an efficient instrument to a certain extent. 
Namely, a higher interest rate increases probability of 
default, and thus the bank may be unable to charge a 
sufficiently high interest rate to make the loan 
profitable enough for the bank, taking account of the 
risks. This phenomenon is called credit rationing. 
Finally, banks‟ adjustment to changed risks is reflected in the maturities of new loans as well: maturities of new 
loans shortened significantly; especially the quantity of (typically investment) loans with a maturity of over five 
years fell drastically. Of course, this latter development may be explained by demand reasons as well: in 
recession periods, given weak aggregate demand, companies do not expand their production capacities, postpone 
their larger-volume investment, and they borrow primarily for liquidity reasons. 
 
  
Amount of new loans (Bn 
HUF)
Average probability of default (per cent)
2,007 2,011
Change 
(per 
cent)
2007 2011 Change Supply Portfolio
Agriculture, mining 282 240 -14.89 2.57 5.06 2.49 -0.24 2.73
Manufacturing 1,190 1,140 -4.20 1.98 3.25 1.27 -0.49 1.76
Construction 533 200 -62.48 2.63 4.97 2.33 -0.35 2.68
Trade 1,360 841 -38.16 2.28 4.11 1.83 -0.40 2.23
Transport, tourism, catering 436 285 -34.63 2.32 4.33 2.01 -0.33 2.34
Information, communication, 
research
383 321 -16.19 2.28 4.15 1.86 -0.38 2.24
Real estate transactions, 
financial and insurance 
services
891 437 -50.95 3.24 7.70 4.46 0.35 4.11
Administration, education, 
health care
136 128 -5.88 2.92 6.65 3.73 0.16 3.57
Other 256 265 3.52 1.69 2.77 1.08 -0.43 1.50
Total 5,467 3,857 -29.45 2.41 4.38 1.97 -0.40 2.36
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Chart 26: Net quarterly changes in loans to households 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
Chart 27: Gross lending of the domestic banking sector in the 
household segment 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In parallel with easing supply conditions, 
households’ demand for loans remains subdued 
Contraction in household loans outstanding 
continued after the early repayment scheme 
ended as well. In 2012 H1, domestic financial 
intermediaries‟ household loans outstanding fell 
drastically, two third of which was attributable to 
the effect of the early repayment scheme (Chart 26). 
The scheme affected both housing loans and 
consumer loans as well, through home equity loans. 
Disregarding the amount of early repayments, the 
household sector would still repay debt in net terms. 
Apart from refinancing loans related to early 
repayments, new loan volumes dropped sharply. 
The decline in outstanding loans caused by the early 
repayments has, ceteris paribus, a positive impact on 
the quarterly net change in loans outstanding, as the 
amount of the regular principal payment of the loans 
concerned is not included in the further repayments. 
However, the decline in loans outstanding in the two 
quarters, in addition to the early repayments, 
exceeds that of the same period last year, which is 
attributable to a drop in new loan volumes. In 2012 
H1, new loan volumes sank to levels unseen since the 
early 2000s, amounting to approximately 70 per cent 
of the average volume of the period preceding the 
early repayments (Chart 27). This magnitude of a 
decline in lending is primarily attributable to the 
tightening of credit conditions in connection with the 
early repayments. 
Easing in credit conditions only started in Q2. 
During the period of early repayments, credit 
conditions were reported to have tightened in the 
household segment, which fundamentally 
determined developments in 2011 Q4 and 2012 Q1. 
The strict non-price conditions were slightly eased 
only in 2012 Q2, when banks eased the payment-to-
income (PTI) and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. Looking 
ahead, on the one hand, lenders participating in the 
lending survey plan a slight tightening in conditions 
on risky loans in 2012 H2. On the other hand, further 
easing is expected, mainly in price conditions. 
No substantial easing took place in the price 
conditions of household loans in 2012 H1 either, 
but the new conditions of the state interest rate 
subsidy may boost borrowing. Simultaneously with 
the early repayments, price conditions also became 
tighter as of end-2011, and, although with some 
minor adjustment, they practically remained 
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Chart 28: Annual percentage rate of charge (APRC) of new HUF 
loans to households 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
Chart 29: Changes in real income and consumption on a year-
on-year basis and the consumer confidence index 
 
Sources: CSO, GKI and MNB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
unchanged in 2012 H1 as well (Chart 28). As a result, 
in June spreads on forint housing and home equity 
loans exceeded the average of the period preceding 
the early repayments by approximately 1.5 
percentage points. These developments in credit 
conditions cannot be separated from the other 
additional risks that arose due to the early 
repayments and affect the loans outstanding, but the 
risk premium included in the interest rates is only 
returning to the earlier levels at a slower pace. A 
slight decline in interest rates was observed in June, 
and looking ahead banks are planning to reduce their 
interest rate spreads as well. The shift in credit 
conditions may be supported by the amended system 
of conditions of the state interest rate subsidy as 
well. With the termination of the difference 
between the earlier interest rate ceiling and the 
market interest level, clients may use the subsidised 
schemes at an average interest rate level of 
approximately 9 per cent during the five years of the 
subsidy. Accordingly, the effective forint interest to 
be paid is roughly close to the 2010 levels, and is 
expected to result in an increase in new 
disbursements. 
The cyclical factors determining credit demand 
deteriorated in 2012. The deterioration in the 
economic environment is clearly reflected in the 
case of households as well. Real wages have been 
declining at a faster pace practically since the 
beginning of the year and as a result, consumption 
also contracted in both quarters (Chart 29). In 
addition, the household confidence indicator has 
been steadily declining since end-2010. All of this 
reflects the deterioration in households‟ income 
position and a strengthening of precautionary 
considerations; jointly, they have a negative impact 
on credit demand. 
Deterioration in external and domestic 
circumstances justifies a revision in lending 
forecasts 
Expectations worsened in corporate lending. 
Although the liquidity tensions with a negative 
impact on the lending capacity of the banking sector 
have eased since our last report, banks‟ portfolio 
quality continued to deteriorate, and in addition, 
banks‟ tax burden increased further; these are 
jointly leading to a decline in willingness to lend, 
which may be exacerbated by the pass-through of 
the transaction tax as of 2013 (Box 5.). The 
worsening economic outlook has a material impact 
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Chart 30: Forecast for net quarterly changes in corporate loans 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
on corporate credit demand as well, resulting in a 
decline in expected borrowing. The above negative 
impacts may only partly be offset by declining 
funding costs as a result of the cuts in the central 
bank base rate. Taking into account of all these 
factors, our forecast for corporate lending has been 
revised downward: in 2013, domestic financial 
intermediaries‟ loans outstanding may drop by a 
total 5.3 per cent, and a further 4.1 per cent decline 
is expected in 2014 (Chart 30). 
BOX 5: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES RELATED TO TRANSACTION TAXES 
In international practice, three basic types of financial transaction taxes can be distinguished: financial 
transaction taxes (FTT) imposed on instruments traded by financial institutions globally or regionally and aiming 
at cutting back speculative financial transactions; financial activity taxes (FAT) imposed on the profit of financial 
institutions and on managers‟ bonuses; and bank transaction taxes (BTT) that mostly affect retail and corporate 
bank transactions. As far as we are concerned, the financial transaction tax planned to be introduced in Hungary 
in the near future can mostly be classified into this last category, i.e. among bank transaction taxes (BTT). 
The use of BTTs is mainly widespread in developing countries, primarily in Latin America and Asia, for a rapid, 
temporary increase in fiscal revenues. However, due to the negative experiences accumulated in the meantime, 
in the period after 2005 many Asian and South American countries terminated BTT-type taxes or replaced them 
with another type of tax.23 As far as we know, at present Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, 
Mexico, Peru, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are still using 
this type of tax. 
Considering the practice of developing economies, it 
can be established that this tax is typically imposed 
on bank deposits, transfers, cash withdrawals and 
credit transactions (similarly to a consumption type 
tax), although both the basis and the magnitude of 
the tax vary considerably. At the same time, a 
common trend is that following introduction – 
primarily due to many negative experiences (increase 
in foreign account turnover and the use of cash, etc.) 
– an increasing number of transaction types were 
taken out from the scope of this tax (interbank 
transactions, transactions between the accounts of 
the same person, transactions related to wages and 
social benefits). The tax rates applied vary 
significantly across countries: at present, they range between half per thousand and 3 per thousand of the 
amount of the transaction, but earlier they reached 1.2–1.5 per cent in several countries. As the holdings serving 
as tax base are rather high (bank account turnover, deposits, etc.), this tax revenue reaches some 1–7 per cent of 
the total tax revenue (or 0.2–1.9 per cent of GDP). 
                                                 
23 Of the South American countries, Brazil, Paraguay and Venezuela terminated the BTT, whereas in Asia and Oceania it was Australia, India and 
Papua New Guinea that did the same (2009 data). In Brazil, following the 2010 elections the idea of the reintroduction of this type of tax was 
brought up, but – as far as we know at the moment – it has not been done yet.  
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As of 1 January 2013, a financial transaction tax (BTT) is expected to be introduced in Hungary as well. The tax 
will be paid by the payment service providers. According to the information presently available to us, as a 
general rule, they will have to pay a tax corresponding to 2 per thousand of the amount of each transaction, but 
not more than HUF 6 thousand. Interbank transactions, the transactions of the MNB, transactions related to the 
securities account, operations related to loan transactions and most of the so-called corporate cash-pool 
transactions are expected to be exempted from the tax. A higher, 3 per thousand tax rate is planned to be 
applied to cash transactions. The Government expects to collect additional fiscal revenues amounting to some 
0.5 per cent of GDP (1.4 per cent of the tax revenues) from this tax. 
Although the Hungarian BTT may provide rapid fiscal revenue, its negative feature is that it „throws sand‟ into 
the operation of financial institutions. In relative terms, it makes financial transactions more expensive, so it 
may impair the efficiency of financial fund allocation.24 If the bank cannot pass the costs on, its ability to 
produce income declines, also resulting in lower willingness to lend. By contrast, if the banking sector is able to 
pass the tax on, by doing so it may make the prices of products and services higher (generating inflation), and 
corporate and household clients may react to it by changing their payment practices. This may result in an 
inefficient structure, which may even strengthen the black economy. 
At the same time, according to the Hungarian regulation, the tax would not apply to the transactions that are the 
most critical and the most „mobile‟ (easy to relocate abroad) from the perspective of the economy, and an upper 
limit is also determined for the tax to be paid. This presumably reduces the disintermediary effect of the 
transaction tax to some extent. In addition, the planned regulation would punish the use of cash, which is 
overwhelmingly expensive in terms of social costs, with a higher tax rate, which may also have favourable 
external effects if banks charge it to cash transactions. 
Accordingly, on the whole, the Hungarian financial transaction tax, which can be considered rather unique in 
developed countries, may have negative effects. The higher the tax rate and the longer this burden remains in 
place, the stronger these negative effects are. 
 
 
 
Chart 31: The distribution of the loans outstanding of banking 
sector by repricing periods (2012 H1) 
 
Note: Data in parenthesis show the share of HUF denominated loans. 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
In the corporate segment, cuts in the central bank 
policy rate may pass through to lending rates 
within short time. Considering the assumed effect 
of policy rate cuts, it is worth noting that the share 
of HUF-denominated loans in the outstanding 
portfolio amounts to around 50 percent, while in the 
case of new disbursements it has increased to 65 
percent since the start of the crisis. In addition, the 
relatively large proportion of loans tied to reference 
rate results in a complete re-pricing of the 90 
percent of the corporate portfolio within 3-6 months 
(Chart 31). During the maturity, interest rate spreads 
are fixed, and thus cuts may appear effectively and 
quickly in nominal interest rates. However, it 
depends on banks‟ business decisions, whether and 
to what extent this benefit from the decreasing 
funding costs is shared between lenders and 
borrowers through new disbursements. Nevertheless, 
in the last couple of years, banks rather used their 
non-price conditions (not interest rates) as a means 
                                                 
24 According to Kirilenko – Perry (2004), this meant a deadweight loss amounting to 0.5 per cent of GDP on average in the South American 
countries under review. K irilenko, Andrei - Victoria Perry (2004): On the financial disintermediation of bank transaction taxes, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. According to Albuquerque (2006), the BTT – aptly called „BAD tax‟ (bank account debit tax) by him – generated 
a deadweight loss equalling 0.2 per cent of the GDP of Brazil. Albuquerque, Pedro H. (2006): BAD taxation: Disintermediation and illiquidity in a 
bank account debits tax model, International Tax and Public Finance, 13:5, pp. 601-624.   
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Chart 32: The share of HUF-denominated loans tied to 
reference rate within total household and corporate new loan 
volumes 
 
Note: In parenthesis, monthly average of new HUF-denominated 
loan volumes in the given period. 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 33: Forecast for net quarterly changes in household loans 
 
Source: MNB. 
of tightening, while interest rate spreads seemed to 
be more or less steady. Within new household 
lending the share of loans tied to reference rate is 
increasing (Chart 32). 
The two-year collateralised loan tender has 
become more effective with the amendments in 
conditions. As of October, the central bank 
instrument introduced in March 2012 is operating 
with revised conditions. Overall, the amendment 
results in a significant easing: in the future, banks 
that use this facility have to maintain their level of 
corporate lending compared to the level of 30 June 
2012 excluding commercial real estate loans 
(“modified corporate loan stock”), and within this 
category outstanding loans granted for refinancing 
may also be taken into account. The initial borrowing 
limit is 50 per cent of the modified corporate loan 
stock of the reference period, but may practically 
grow limitlessly by the additional amount stemming 
from the increase in the modified loans outstanding. 
The sanctioning of non-compliance with the 
conditions has also been eased. Thus, the amended 
framework of conditions serves to mitigate the 
undesirable effects of banks‟ deleveraging more 
efficiently, preventing a significant drop in corporate 
lending in the future. 
Looking ahead, negative impacts are expected to 
slightly exceed positive ones in household lending. 
Deteriorating economic prospects have a negative 
effect on lending in the household segment as well: 
the steady deleveraging of households is exacerbated 
by the deterioration in the income position and a 
strengthening in precautionary considerations as 
well. Looking ahead, all of this point to a decline in 
households‟ credit demand. On the supply side, 
twofold developments can be observed. On the one 
hand, the state interest rate subsidy and the cut in 
the central bank policy rate may lead to a slight 
increase primarily in housing loans. Contrary to this 
positive effect, banks‟ rising tax burden may result in 
restrained credit supply. Concerning the joint effects 
of the above, the household lending forecast has 
been slightly revised downward: domestic financial 
intermediaries‟ household loans outstanding are 
expected to decline by 3.4 and 2.0 per cent in 2013 
and 2014, respectively (Chart 33). 
In the case of household lending, the reduction in 
the policy rate may have a more moderate effect. 
The potential effects of policy rate cuts on household 
lending are more constrained than in the corporate 
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segment. The share of HUF denominated loans is only 
40 percent within the overall household loan 
portfolio, in which only a half may be re-priced 
within 6 months. This is the consequence of the 
subsidised mortgage loan portfolio with a longer 
interest rate period and the substantial share of 
consumer loans with fixed interest rates. Although 
newly granted loans are denominated almost 
exclusively in HUF, with one half of these featuring a 
reference interest rate thanks to the transparent 
pricing regime introduced in April 2012, the volume 
of new disbursement is currently low. 
3. PORTFOLIO QUALITY – The rising share of non-performing loans and the 
extended nature of the crisis add to the risk of inadequate loan loss coverage 
The share of non-performing loans continued to increase both in the corporate and household segments during the 
first half of the year. In the case of corporate loans, this was mainly attributable to actual portfolio 
deterioration, whereas in the case of household loans the contraction in the outstanding stock due to the early 
repayment scheme also markedly worsened the NPL ratio. Loan loss provisioning decreased slightly in both cases, 
reflected in the moderate decline in loan loss coverage. In view of the steady rise in the level of non-performing 
loans, adequate loan loss coverage is increasingly important. It reduces funding risks as well as the risk that in the 
case of a shock the banking sector would suffer extreme losses. Mainly in the case of project loans and 
restructured foreign currency mortgage loans, loan loss reserves and the value of collateral indicate inadequate 
coverage, in an international comparison as well. Therefore, it would be necessary to revise loan loss provisioning 
rules and collateral assessment. 
No sign of a turnaround has been seen in the portfolio deterioration on the corporate side since the beginning of 
the crisis. Given the lack of portfolio cleaning and the contraction in loans outstanding, the NPL ratio is not 
expected to decline over the two-year forecast horizon, but slower growth is likely. On the household side, the 
start of debtor assistance programmes may help to arrest the deterioration in portfolio quality in the coming two 
years. The share of non-performing loans within total loans is expected to peak at end-2013. At the same time, 
declining trends are expected in loan loss provisioning in both segments assuming that no additional loan loss 
provisioning is set aside on outstanding non-performing loans, thus coverage remains insufficient. 
Chart 34: Share of non-performing corporate loans of the 
banking sector 
 
Note: Columns by contracts, whereas the share within total loans is 
shown by clients. In the case of the net NPL, the loans were taken into 
account at net value, i.e. loan loss provisioning was deducted from the 
gross values. 
Source: MNB. 
Continuing deterioration in portfolio quality 
Over the first half of this year, the share of non-
performing loans within the corporate portfolio 
continued to rise. The share of non-performing 
corporate loans in the portfolio has been rising 
strongly since the start of the crisis (Chart 34). Due to 
the drastic fall in domestic consumption, the poor 
state of the economy affects companies active on the 
domestic market particularly severely. Project loans, 
representing a substantial, more than 20 per cent 
share of banks‟ corporate loans, are mostly related to 
domestic real estate investments; therefore, the 
weakness of the domestic market is determining their 
performance. With the drawn-out nature of the crisis, 
more and more of these loans are inevitably 
becoming non-performing. During the first half of the 
year, the rising share of non-performing loans to total 
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Chart 35: Cost of provisioning to total loans in the corporate 
segment 
 
Source: MNB. 
Chart 36: Loan loss coverage of non-performing corporate 
loans 
 
Source: MNB. 
Chart 37: Share of non-performing household loans in the 
banking sector 
 
Note: In the case of the net NPL, the loans were taken into account at 
net value, i.e. loan loss provisioning was deducted from the gross 
values. 
Source: MNB.  
loans was primarily attributable to such loans. As a 
result, by the end of the first half of the year the NPL 
ratio exceeded 20 per cent, reaching as much as 25 
per cent in the case of project loans. With respect to 
corporate loans as a whole, taking account of the net 
value of non-performing loans, the ratio is around 12 
per cent. This means that 12 per cent of the portfolio 
comprises non performing loans not backed by loan 
loss reserves. 
Following the strong loan loss provisioning at the 
end of last year, loan losses declined somewhat in 
H1. At end-2011, due to the gloomy economic 
outlook, banks implemented vast amounts of 
provisioning, raising the cost of provisioning above 4 
per cent. This indicator declined to some extent in 
the first half of this year, but the value of 3.8 per 
cent continues to be historically very high. Similarly 
to developments in non-performing loans, differences 
can be observed across segments here as well. The 
worse performance of project loans entailed greater 
loan losses in H1. Other corporate loans tilted the 
indicator downwards (Chart 35). 
Loan loss coverage of non-performing loans slightly 
declined by June 2012. Despite an increase in the 
non-performing portfolio, the cost of provisioning 
declined in H1, as reflected in loan loss coverage as 
well. Although at individual level the bank with the 
worst performance improved coverage, at the 
system-wide level the indicator declined to 49 per 
cent from the 51 per cent observed at end-2011 
(Chart 36). In recent years, we observed similar 
trends in the second quarters, i.e. the share of non-
performances within total loans of banks increased 
markedly, while coverage declined. Therefore, due to 
the seasonality, the current shift in itself does not 
pose a high risk. 
In 2012 Q2, portfolio quality continued to 
deteriorate in the household segment as well. 
Within household loans, the ratio of loans 90 days 
past due increased from 13 per cent to above 16 per 
cent in half a year (Chart 37). This increase was 
partly the technical effect of the contraction in loans 
outstanding as a result of the early repayment 
scheme. This change in the denominator by itself 
added more than 1 percentage point of deterioration 
in the NPL ratio this year. However, the increase was 
high even apart from that. The favourable effect of 
the state programmes had not yet materialised during 
H1, as the purchases by the National Asset 
Management Agency were not launched yet, the 
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conversion of non-performing loans into forints mostly 
occurred in Q3, and the applications to the exchange 
rate cap scheme fell behind our earlier expectations 
to date (Box 6). Re-defaults of restructured loans 
outstanding also played a significant role in the 
increase. More than 30 per cent of the restructured 
loans are non-performing, and in spite of the 
continued increase in the renegotiated loans 
outstanding, there was no material change in the 
ratio of performing restructured loans. Taking into 
account the net value of non-performing loans, the 
NPL ratio also increased, but remained between 9–10 
per cent.  
BOX 6: GOVERNMENT MEASURES TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF PROBLEM HOUSEHOLD LOANS AND THEIR 
EFFECTS 
A programme package was prepared on the basis of the agreement concluded between the Government and the 
Hungarian Banking Association in December 2011, aimed at solving the problems of foreign currency mortgage 
loan borrowers. The details of the programme package were discussed in both the April Report on Financial 
Stability and last December‟s Quarterly Report on Inflation. Therefore, only a brief review of the changes since 
spring is presented here. 
I. Exchange rate cap. Foreign 
currency mortgage loan debtors 
without arrears outstanding 
longer than 90 day may enter 
the exchange rate cap scheme 
until 31 December 2012.25 
Participating debtors may pay 
their instalments at fixed 
exchange rates – HUF/CHF 180, 
HUF/EUR 250 and HUF/JPY 2.5 
– until 30 June 2017. Out of the 
difference, the interest part is 
paid by the state and the 
lender, whereas the principal 
part is accumulated on a 
technical account of the 
borrower (technically financed 
by a HUF-denominated loan). 
Early application is a rational 
decision for all eligible debtors, as they would receive transfers from the state and the bank, without waiving any 
rights. In addition, the earlier they enter, the longer they receive the transfer. Nevertheless, by end-August 2012 
a mere 16 per cent of eligible borrowers had applied. Even accounting for the fact that the programme was 
opened for all groups of debtors only as of 1 September, the ratio is lower than the earlier expectations of the 
MNB. The underlying explanation may be that the scheme is relatively complicated, and the principal part entails 
new borrowing as well, deterring an increasing number of people in view of the negative experiences of the 
crisis. As a matter of fact, debtors do not undertake any significant additional risk by participating, if they save 
the principal part. Altogether, an increase in participation is anticipated in the coming months, but the 
                                                 
25 More exactly, those debtors whose default is not more than 90 days, and a further condition is that the borrowed amount did not exceed HUF 
20 million upon borrowing and the debtor is not in a payment easing programme. 
Foreign currency mortgage loans outstanding
(31.08.2012)
Debtors more than 90 days past due
(30.06.2012)
Restructured, still performing loans
(30.06.2012)
End-August 2012 status
Exchange rate 
limit
Conversion into 
forints
Loans eligible for the given programme:* 2,951 HUF Bn 126 HUF Bn
Participants in the programme:  468 HUF Bn  23 HUF Bn
Participation ratio (pre cent): 15.9% 17.5%
MNB forecast for the final participation ratio
 (per cent): 70% -
 3,705 HUF Bn
 754 HUF Bn
 514 HUF Bn
*For the exchange rate limit, loans in a default of less than 90 days were considered eligible, even 
if they were restructured. Although a precondition of participating in the programme is that the 
client should not be in default, these loans can easily be made eligible. Upon the conversion into 
forints, not cancelled loans in an at least 90-day default on 30 September 2011 were considered 
eligible.
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participation ratio may be 70 per cent, as opposed to the 90 per cent projected earlier. This instrument is 
expected to be suitable for considerably decelerating any further credit quality deterioration of foreign currency 
mortgage loans. 
II. Conversion of non-performing foreign currency mortgage loans. In the case of foreign currency mortgage loans 
more than 90 days past due on 30 September 2011 (by at least HUF 78,000), by 15 May 2012 debtors were 
entitled to request their respective banks to convert their loans to forints at the average MNB exchange rates 
between 15 May and 15 June (HUF/CHF 248.5, HUF/EUR 298.6 and HUF/JPY 2.99). Banks had to cancel 25 per 
cent of the debt converted into forints, but were allowed to deduct 30 per cent of the resulting loss from the 
2012 bank levy. However, in line with our expectations, this programme was only able to offer a solution for a 
small portion of borrowers. Firstly, the conditions of the programme were strict: the value of the client‟s real 
estate upon borrowing could not exceed HUF 20 million; and in April 2012 the programme was tightened 
slightly.26 Secondly, despite the 25 per cent debt cancellation, the programme would have been unable to 
considerably reduce clients‟ debt servicing burdens, as the higher interest rates of the new forint loans offset the 
debt cancellation (the related state interest rate subsidy, which is available only for a limited number of clients, 
could only result in temporary easing). Accordingly, this scheme was able to provide assistance to debtors where 
foreclosure seems to be the real solution: following the auction sale of collateral and the repayment of the loan, 
the debtor has more money / lower debt for a restart as a result of the debt cancellation. Consequently, few 
debtors applied to this programme, and by the statutory deadline of 31 August, credit institutions converted 
foreign exchange loans amounting to HUF 23 billion (around 3,100 loans). Therefore, this instrument failed to 
markedly improve the high non-performing loan ratio. 
III. National Asset Management Agency. The National Asset Management Agency purchases and lets back at a 
price determined by law the properties of debtors raising at least one child and receiving some sort of social 
benefits. The transaction requires the consent of both the debtor and the lender(s). The purchase price of the 
property is spent on honouring the creditor(s) claims, whereas the pledgee financial institution(s) renounce(s) 
any possible claim that might additionally remain on the debtor. During the summer, all of the legislation for the 
operation of the National Asset Management Agency was adopted, and the conditions of participation were also 
eased (previously, two dependants had been the eligibility criterion). Hence, the properties transferred to the 
National Asset Management Agency will not be included in the auction quotas either. As the necessary legislation 
entered into effect only at the beginning of the summer, and then banks also had to conclude contracts with the 
National Asset Management Agency, only a few real estate purchases have taken place to date. Accordingly, in 
our opinion it is unlikely that the National Asset Management Agency will succeed in taking over the 8,000 
properties designated for this year. However, the unused portion of this quota can be carried over to next year. 
Nevertheless, it is still doubtful whether there will be a sufficient number of troubled debtors who can meet all 
the conditions of participating in the programme.27 Therefore, a further easing in the conditions may be 
necessary in the future so that the National Asset Management Agency can utilise the complete quota (25,000 
properties) available until 2014. Nevertheless, the programme may be suitable for solving the problem of the 
socially most needy, as the rents determined by the National Asset Management Agency are low (an annual 1.5 
per cent of the value upon borrowing of the flat taken over). It is also advantageous that the properties taken 
over by the National Asset Management Agency are not included in the auctioning quota, and as the clients 
planned to be taken over until 2014 account for nearly 20 per cent of non-performing mortgage loan debtors at 
present, this may considerably accelerate banks‟ portfolio cleaning. 
 
  
                                                 
26 Accordingly, banks were obliged to offer the conversion scheme only to debtors whose contracts had not yet been terminated. However, 
banks were still entitled to enter into such agreements with debtors whose contracts had been terminated, and 30 per cent of the 25 per cent 
debt cancellation could be deducted from the bank tax in these cases as well. 
27 Probably, it is the criterion concerning the number of children (at least 1 child in the household) that can be met by as many debtors as the 
total capacity of the National Asset Management Agency (25,000 properties by 2014). However, for the time being we do not have any 
information on the number of those who meet the condition of receiving social benefits (as this information is not available for commercial 
banks either). 
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Chart 38: Ratio of non-performing household loans by products 
in the banking sector 
 
Source: MNB. 
Chart 39: Distribution of mortgage loan debtors according to 
number of contracts 
 
Source: Central Credit Information System. 
Chart 40: Cost of provisioning to total loans and loan loss 
coverage in the household segment 
 
Source: MNB. 
The weakness of the exchange rate of the forint 
against the Swiss franc continued to affect 
household portfolio quality. The examination of 
individual products reveals that the significant 
portfolio deterioration mainly affected foreign 
currency denominated products (Chart 38), although 
the dynamics is partly explained by the early 
repayment scheme here as well. At the same time, in 
the case of forint loans only slight deterioration has 
been observed in the NPL ratios, while their level in 
the case of mortgage loans, which constitute a major 
share of household loans, is significantly lower. 
Accordingly, the launch of the exchange rate cap may 
contribute to containing deterioration. 
The complete credit registry system may result in 
an improvement in transparency and in a decline in 
excessive indebtedness. Since May 2012, records of 
the reference data of household debtors have become 
complete in practice as well in the Central Credit 
Information System (so-called positive debtor list), 
which had been advocated by the MNB for a long 
time. Indisputably, the new system entailed improved 
transparency: namely, current data reveal that 
90,000 out of the roughly one million mortgage loan 
debtors in Hungary are in default with one of their 
loans, and default propensity is higher among 
borrowers with more than one loan contract (Chart 
39). The debtor‟s ability to handle the burdens 
declines with an increase in indebtedness, resulting in 
a greater probability of default. Therefore, with an 
improvement in transparency, in the future the 
„positive debtor list‟ may contribute to the 
prevention of borrowers‟ excessive indebtedness, 
thereby preventing multiple defaults of their loans. 
The cost of provisioning as a proportion of total 
loans did not change significantly in H1. As a result 
of the early repayment scheme, banks suffered 
considerable losses on the household portfolio, and 
thus the actual cost of provisioning surged to extreme 
level as of end-2011. However, disregarding the 
effects of the early repayment scheme, following a 
slight decline in Q2, the value of the indicator hardly 
exceeds 2 per cent, which corresponds to the levels 
observed in 2009 (Chart 40). Lower loan loss 
provisioning also had a slightly negative impact on the 
coverage of the non-performing household portfolio. 
Maintaining high loan loss coverage is important in 
terms of financial stability as well, so that banks can 
withstand a price fall in collateral values. 
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Chart 41: Portfolio quality indicators of the local government 
sector 
 
Source: MNB. 
In the local government sector, the ratios of non-
performing and restructured loans continue to rise; 
however, the increase in provisions does not keep 
pace with the expansion in the stock of 
restructured loans. Apart from the one-off effect of 
the decline in the stock of troublesome loans by the 
first quarter of 2012 after the Government assumed 
the debts of county governments, the ratios of non-
performing and restructured local government loans 
are increasing steadily (Chart 41). The ratio of 
provisions set aside by credit institutions to the stock 
of troublesome loans is at its level at the end of 2011, 
implying that the loan loss coverage ratio for non-
performing loans appears to be stabilising at below 16 
per cent and that for restructured loans at below 5 
per cent. Provisions appear to insufficiently cover 
restructured loans, as the majority of banks active in 
the sector do not make provisions against 
restructured loans at all. However, the latest 
Government measures may alter significantly our 
view of the banks‟ claims on the local government 
sector(Box 7). 
 
BOX 7: GOVERNMENT MEASURES IN ORDER TO SETTLE THE DEBT PORBLEM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS  
According to the Government‟s plans made public at end-October 2012, the state will continue to consolidate the 
local government sector, and will assume further debts from local authorities. The newly announced measures 
may considerably contribute to the easing of financial tensions in the sector. Before describing the package of 
measures, we think it is necessary to review the liabilities of local governments vis-à-vis the banking sector.  
Total accounts receivable of the banking sector from local governments nearly doubled in the two year preceding 
the crisis. However, net exposure of the sector to the banking system started to deteriorate only in 2010. This 
was mainly attributable to the fact that local governments deposited funds at banks, but in 2010 they started to 
withdraw their deposits. Seventy-five per cent of bonds outstanding, which account for nearly half of the debt, 
are denominated in Swiss francs, and another 15 per cent is denominated in euro. Accordingly, the weak 
exchange rate of the forint resulted in a significant increase in local governments‟ debt to the banking sector. As 
the interest rates of foreign currency denominated bonds are mainly tied to reference rates (CHF LIBOR, 
EURIBOR), the negative effect of the weak forint exchange rate is partly offset by the decline in reference rates 
to a historically low level. However, this is only true for interest payments; the appreciation of the Swiss franc 
appears in principal repayments entirely. This is particularly risky as repayments of bonds usually start after a 
grace period of several years, a significant portion of which will expire over the coming one year. While in early 
2012 half of the bond-related grace period expired, 90 per cent of bonds will be in the repayment period by end-
2013.  
The Government has already taken various measures to put the financial position of the local government sector 
in order. First, at end-2011 it assumed some HUF 170 billion of debt from county local governments, resulting in 
an easing of tensions related to the financial management of county local governments, which were in the most 
stressed position due to their limited room to collect revenues. Second, in January 2012, a statutory regulation 
that limits borrowing by local governments was introduced, expected to prevent a further increase in debt. 
Pursuant to the new regulations, local governments may enter into transactions that result in debt only with the 
approval of the government. However, loans for advances or down-payment of development assistance obtained 
from international organisations, loans with a maturity of up to one year, reorganisation loans and loans not 
exceeding a value limit depending on settlement type are exceptions to the rule.    
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According to the latest information, the assumption of the debt of county local governments was only the first 
step in the consolidation of the sector: the Government is planning the assumption of more than HUF 600 billion, 
i.e. almost half of local governments‟ total debt of nearly HUF 1,300 billion in a differentiated manner. 
According to the already announced but not yet adopted government measures, the state will assume the total 
debt of settlements with less than 5,000 inhabitants; it means the debt of 1,673 local governments in excess of 
HUF 97 billion. The assumption of the debt of local governments with a higher population depends on the per 
capita local tax revenue of local governments. Where the per capita local tax revenue of the local government 
does not reach 50 per cent of the average of the sector, the state will assume 70 per cent of the outstanding 
debt (a total HUF 45.3 billion). In the case of a per capita local tax revenue between 50 and 75 per cent of the 
average of the sector the planned magnitude of the assumption is 60 per cent (a total HUF 79.4 billion), whereas 
in the case of a per capita local tax revenue between 75 and 100 per cent the state assumes half of the debt (a 
total HUF 145.1 billion). The state will assume 40 per cent (a total HUF 244.7 billion) of the debt of the local 
governments where the per capita local tax revenue is above the average. The assumption of debt does not 
influence the size of government debt, as – in line with accounting standards – it has to be calculated in a 
consolidated manner, together with the outstanding debt of the local government sector. Similarly, the general 
government deficit will also not be influenced by the planned measure.  
A positive result of the debt assumption may be that it allows the arrangement of the financial management of 
excessively indebted local governments, and – complementing other measures that concern the sector (for 
example the limiting of borrowing) – it may prevent the rebuilding of debts. This may also be advantageous for 
the banks that lend to the sector. First, a decline in risks may also result in lower loan loss provisioning 
requirements; consequently, profitability may improve. Second, it will be an immediate effect that – in line with 
the Basel capital rule – the risk weights assigned to the government exposure are significantly lower than that of 
the local government exposure; accordingly, capital may free up to credit institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 42: Ratio of non-performing loans and the cost of 
provisioning in the corporate segment 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No turnaround is seen in the trend of the corporate 
NPL ratio over the forecast horizon 
By the end of our two-year forecast period, more 
than one quarter of corporate loans may become 
non-performing. As regards corporate loans, we still 
cannot see any factors that could break the rising 
trend in the NPL ratio. The growth outlook remains 
weak, particularly for domestic consumption. 
Therefore, in the coming period no improvement is 
expected in the credit quality of large real estate 
projects and the SME sector, which are particularly 
sensitive to subdued domestic demand. Other factors 
with an impact on the NPL ratio are also not expected 
to change markedly. Portfolio cleaning continues to 
be sluggish, and the corporate portfolio will contract 
over the coming two-year period. As a result of this, 
the NPL ratio may rise above 25 per cent by mid-2014 
(Chart 42). In the meantime, in line with the slower 
growth in non-performing loans, the cost of 
provisioning may be around the level of 2.5 per cent 
observed in earlier periods of the crisis, i.e. lower 
than the current outlier, assuming that no additional 
loan loss provisioning is set aside on outstanding non-
performing loans.  
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Chart 43: Ratio of non-performing loans and the cost of 
provisioning in the household segment 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 44: Annual growth in non-performing loans in the 
banking system 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
Steady deterioration in the household segment may 
be prevented by state programmes. By the middle 
of this year, the share of non-performing loans within 
the portfolio exceeded 16 per cent, but government 
programmes may help to curb the rise. The exchange 
rate cap may provide significant assistance for 
debtors with debt servicing difficulties caused by 
elevated instalments. Accordingly, the upper limit of 
HUF/CHF 180 reduces the probability of default of 
participants (our forecast is based on a 70 per cent 
participation ratio). In addition, conversion of a part 
of non-performing loans into forints together with 
partial debt cancellation may slightly improve the 
NPL ratio. Finally, the low portfolio cleaning ratio 
may be boosted by the actual start-up of the National 
Asset Management Agency, which plans to purchase 
8,000 properties this year, and a further 7,000 next 
year and 10,000 in 2014 (our calculations are based 
on a more conservative estimate than these figures). 
In view of these factors, no significant increase in the 
NPL ratio is expected in the coming two years. The 
indicator may peak around 17 per cent in the middle 
of next year and may already decline to 16.5 per cent 
by the end of the forecast horizon. In parallel with an 
improving NPL ratio, the cost of provisioning may also 
improve. At the end of the two-year time horizon, 
the indicator may drop below the level of 2 per cent 
(Chart 43), assuming that no additional loan loss 
provisioning is set aside on outstanding non-
performing loans. 
In order to reduce risks, it is necessary to tighten 
loan loss provisioning rules and collateral appraisal 
At present, in connection with portfolio quality the 
‘flow’ problem poses a lower risk to financial 
stability. At present, managing the steadily rising, 
elevated NPL ratio poses the greatest challenge to 
the domestic banking sector. For an adequate 
assessment of the problem in line with its magnitude 
and severity, the („flow‟) problem originating from 
the steady rise and the („stock‟) problem stemming 
from the high outstanding amount of non-performing 
loans have to be separated. The increase in non-
performing loans („flow‟ problem) determines the size 
of the new loan loss provisioning requirement on 
newly impaired loans, directly reducing the earning 
potential of the banking sector. At the same time, we 
expect a material deceleration in the growth rate 
over our forecast horizon (Chart 44), which obviously 
entails a significant decline in required new 
provisioning. 
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Chart 45: Cleaning of non-performing loans of the banking 
sector 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 46: Proportion of non-performing loans and their loan 
loss coverage in the wider region 
 
Note: The figures in parentheses indicate the reference period of the 
NPL ratio. 1 = 2011 Q4, 2 = 2012 Q1, 3 = 2012 Q2. Coverage data for 
Hungary: 2012 Q2; for the other countries the latest data for 2011 
based on the EBCI report. 
Sources: EBCI, IMF FSI, MNB. 
 
The primary risk is the tremendous amount of non-
performing loans outstanding (‘stock’ problem). 
The massive amount of non-performing loans has a 
negative impact on the banking system in several 
regards. Firstly, new provisioning requirements may 
arise on outstanding non-performing loans as well. A 
change in collateral value (for example due to a drop 
in real estate prices) or a larger exposure following 
forint depreciation in the case of foreign currency 
loans may warrant new loan loss provisioning. Non-
performing loans weigh on profitability not only 
through loan losses, but also through refinancing 
costs, without having revenue on the assets. In 
addition to solvency problems, the high NPL ratio has 
a negative impact on banks‟ liquidity position as well. 
Financial institutions have to refinance the non-
performing portfolio, and these liabilities have to be 
rolled over, which may also increase the maturity 
mismatch. In addition, a high NPL ratio may also 
weigh on banks‟ willingness to lend. Finally, NPLs may 
also have a negative impact in terms of reputation as 
well. Although the definition of the indicator varies 
across countries, and thus their levels are difficult to 
compare, investors still pay particular attention to it 
in their risk perception, which may be reflected in 
funding costs as well. 
Reducing the NPL ratio should be a key objective. 
The NPL ratio could be reduced by accelerated 
portfolio cleaning (numerator declines) or a rebound 
in lending (an increase in the denominator). Portfolio 
cleaning is very sluggish in the Hungarian banking 
sector. At a quarterly level, 3-4 per cent of non-
performing loans are cleaned out from bank books, 
which means that the total non-performing portfolio 
would be cleaned up in the banking system within 6-8 
years (Chart 45). Therefore, cleaning must be 
facilitated in order to manage the problem, which 
makes close cooperation with financial institutions 
indispensable (Box 8). A pick-up in lending would also 
support an improvement in the NPL ratio. With an 
increase in lending, through the rise in performing 
loans outstanding, profitability could also improve. 
The significantly better indicators of neighbouring 
countries (Chart 46) are also partly explained by the 
much more favourable developments in lending. 
 
 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
20
08
 Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
20
09
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
20
10
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
20
11
 Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
20
12
 Q
1
Q
2
per centHUF Bn
Cleaned stock - households Cleaned stock - corporate
Cleaning ratio - households (RHS) Cleaning ratio - households (RHS)
Montenegro (1)
Albania (1) Serbia (1)
Lithuania (3)
Latvia (2)
Bulgaria (1)
Ukraine (3)
Romania (2)
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (3)
Hungary (3)
Croatia (3)
Moldova (3)
FYR Macedonia 
(2)
Poland (1)
Slovakia (2)Czech Republic 
(2)
Slovenia (2)
Estonia (2)
0
5
10
15
20
20 40 60 80 100
R
a
ti
o
 o
f 
n
o
n
 p
e
rf
o
rm
in
g
 l
o
a
n
s 
to
 t
o
ta
l 
lo
a
n
 
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
(p
e
r 
c
e
n
t)
Coverage ratio of non performing loans(per cent)
  42/79 
BOX 8: MANAGING NON-PERFORMING LOANS IN BANKS’ PORTFOLIOS 
In September 2012, the MNB conducted a survey and interviews with commercial bankers active in the field of 
work-out. We reviewed work-out processes and sought answers as to why banks do not clear non-performing 
loans off their books more rapidly and how this process could be accelerated. The survey was conducted 
separately both for the retail and corporate business units. 
Household portfolio 
In the household segment, managing non-performing loans is significantly determined by state programmes, 
which were discussed thoroughly in Box 6. Here we only point out that in the programme of defaulted foreign 
currency denominated mortgage loan conversion combined with partial debt cancellation, some banks deviated 
from the market average with their strategies. These credit institutions offered the new forint loans to the 
defaulted borrowers with interest rates well below the market rate, and thus – together with the partial debt 
cancellation – the debt servicing burden could even have declined below the original sum. These strategies have 
been much more successful than what was generally observed in the sector.28 
Another relevant state intervention is the auction quota scheme. Some of the responding banks reported that 
they could not completely utilise the quotas, as the market is unable to absorb even this limited number of 
properties. At the same time, the quotas may still be a limiting factor regionally or in the case of certain types of 
transactions, thus rethinking the geographical distribution of the quotas may be worth considering. In addition, 
the capacity of the credit management market is also strongly limited, and bid prices offered by credit 
management companies are very low. Therefore, at present, credit institutions mostly prefer to manage these 
problem loans themselves. Since legal enforcements are overwhelmingly costly and time-consuming, credit 
institutions usually strive to reach mutual agreement with their clients. 
As for unsecured loans, portfolio cleaning mostly takes place through selling to credit management companies. A 
well-functioning system was developed for these types of transactions: banks usually compile transaction 
packages on a monthly or quarterly basis, and sell them through tendering, reaching around 10 percent recovery 
rate. 
Overall, non-performing household loans being stuck on banks‟ balance sheets – mainly in the case of secured 
loans – is attributable to the legal framework and to the insufficient absorbing capacity of the credit 
management and real estate markets. Credit institutions basically consider return more important than the speed 
of portfolio cleaning. In the case of households, the relationship between non-performing loans and new lending 
is weak. Subdued lending is rather attributable to credit demand, though it is also the consequence of the weak 
economy, just as in the case of deteriorating portfolio quality. Accordingly, a decline in non-performing 
household loans in itself would not lead to rebound in lending. 
Corporate portfolio 
The breakdown of defaulted corporate loans by sector and company size was also analysed in the corporate loans 
section of the above survey on developments in work-out. Unsurprisingly, this shows that company size is 
inversely proportional to the frequency of defaults. As regards sectors, the NPL ratio is high mainly in sectors 
related to the commercial real estate market. 
                                                 
28 Moreover, as these banks offered the conversion into forints also to their debtors who were „non-mandatory‟ according to the programme, 
i.e. whose contracts had already been terminated, the ratio of participants was higher than in the case of banks concentrating only on the 
mandatory part of the programme. 
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We collected data on the collateral for non-
performing loans and on loan loss provisioning 
as well. The results show that the highest 
proportion of collateralised debts is, as 
expected, found in the case of real estate 
projects, and in the micro enterprises 
segment, where loans are typically backed by 
the private properties of entrepreneurs. Loan 
loss reserves on non-performing loans and the 
sum of collateral values exceed outstanding 
debt in most of the segments, with a few 
exceptions, including commercial real estate 
projects, which account for the majority of 
non-performing loans. This may indicate that 
loan loss provisioning is inadequate, but 
recovery naturally comes not only from the 
collateral but also from the client‟s cash flow. 
When problem corporate loans can no longer be managed by restructuring, banks launch collateral enforcement 
procedures. The collection of claims are more often managed the credit institutions themselves in the corporate 
segment, and claims are sold more rarely, with typically the exception of small enterprise loans. Some banks 
even established separate real estate management organisations to manage the commercial property exposure 
stemming from problem corporate loans and project finance. Debt-to-equity conversions and the transfer of the 
equities into a venture capital fund may also occur in the case of more viable projects, although this is a rather 
rare solution. 
Banks‟ responses reveal that portfolio cleaning is slow as credit institutions expect a higher return on keeping the 
transactions in the portfolio, and the related legal procedures – cases under dispute, liquidation, negotiations 
among creditors – are more sluggish and costly than in the household segment. Respondents mainly saw the 
relationship of high NPL ratio with new lending in that higher loan loss rates are built into the expected risk 
premium of new clients, and the uncertainty of the loss given default prompts banks to keep capital buffers high. 
Proposals – How could work-out be improved? 
1. Improving the legal environment. During our survey, credit institutions indicated that they see a number of 
further possibilities to strengthen creditors‟ rights and to accelerate collateral enforcement procedures. At the 
same time, of course, the balance between creditors‟ and debtors‟ rights cannot be lost either. In order to 
explore the possibilities in the improvement of the legal environment, it would be useful to set up a joint 
committee comprised of the government, creditors‟ representatives and the supervisory authorities. Due to the 
complex nature of the subject, only some examples are listed here: 
 Review of the tax and accounting legislation related to debt cancellation: it would be worth it to 
consider easing the conditions of debt cancellation. Under certain conditions debt cancellation would not 
result in income for the debtor (i.e. no tax consequence), and could be booked as cost by banks (i.e. tax 
shield effect). This would add to the chances of an agreement between the parties. 
 Review of the operational frameworks of legal enforcements and liquidation proceedings: although there 
have recently been positive changes with the amendments to bankruptcy and legal enforcement rules,29 
these seem to be insufficient. For example, it would be desirable to strengthen the motivation and 
accountability of bailiffs and liquidators and to improve these players‟ professional supervision and the 
transparency of their operation. Even the Act on Bankruptcy as a whole could be reviewed in connection 
with the entry into force of the new Civil Code in 2014. 
 Personal bankruptcy: in line with earlier proposals of the MNB, we still believe that it would be worth 
                                                 
29 For example, the increasing number of liquidators and the intended improvement in the transparency of ownership of liquidating companies. 
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considering creating a bankruptcy option for private persons, which also takes creditors‟ interests into 
account. 
2. Transfer of non-performing loans into separate legal entities: in respect of some loan types, particularly 
project finance loans, the owners of domestic banks should be provided with incentives to separate out problem 
portfolio elements and continue to manage and finance them in a separate legal entity (a sort of „bad bank‟), 
thus capital needs for new lending and losses on outstanding debt could be better separated. 
3. Tightening of loan loss provisioning rules: regulatory intervention is possible as well to accelerate portfolio 
cleaning. The present loan loss provisioning rules require the coverage of expected losses stemming from 
receivables by loan loss provisioning. These rules, however, may be combined with other aspects as well, 
similarly to practices of other countries: for example with the length of time elapsed since the default or with 
industry-specific loan loss expectations. 
4. Tightening of collateral appraisal rules: In the household segment, the appraisal of residential real estate 
collaterals is mainly done on a statistical basis, using housing price indices. Appraisal with sampling or for the 
total stock may also take place. However, the frequency of appraisal varies significantly across banks. In the case 
of companies, external appraisers are more often used, whereas the frequency of appraisal is between 1 and 2 
years. We consider the standardisation of collateral appraisal rules and the increasing of the frequency of 
appraisals crucial. 
 
 
Table 3: Loan loss coverage in the corporate and household 
segments 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
Chart 47: Coverage of corporate loans of the banking sector, 
June 2012 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
Due to the large amount of non-performing loans, 
loan loss coverage plays a key role. Firstly, higher 
coverage reduces the probability of further losses; 
secondly, it mitigates refinancing risks as well (Table 
3). The collateral also reduces expected losses. At 
the same time, determining their real values poses 
challenges, in particular when the NPL ratio is 
overwhelmingly high. In this case, banks are able to 
sell collaterals with increasing difficulties and at 
distressed prices. This may considerably divert the 
actual sales price from the expected one. 
Project loans are likely to have inadequate 
coverage. In the case of non-performing project loans 
within the corporate segment, the sum of collateral 
and loan loss reserves is slightly lower than the 
exposure (Chart 47). This may require further 
provisioning, particularly if the value of collateral is 
based on optimistic expected return calculations. 
Inadequate coverage is also observed in the case of 
restructured, but still performing project and other 
corporate loans. This may be a peril particularly in 
the case of project loans, where repeated debt 
restructuring („evergreening‟) is common, and often 
the objective is to postpone facing the problems, 
instead of restoring solvency. 
In the household segment, adequate coverage of 
restructured foreign currency mortgage loans is 
doubtful. In the case of the outstanding non-
performing mortgage loans, the total size of 
collateral and loan loss reserves is higher than the 
total exposure, which – theoretically – may imply that 
no additional provisioning will be required. However, 
Jun-12
Loans 
outstanding 
(HUF Bn)
Non-
performing 
loans
(HUF Bn)
Provisions
(HUF Bn)
Loan loss 
provisioning 
coverage
(per cent)
Corporate loans 6 086 1 294 630 49
Project-finance 1 681 419 157 37
Other loans 4 405 875 473 54
Household loans 6 528 1 055 492 47
from which:
HUF mortgage loans 1 775 134 55 41
FX mortgage loans 3 592 716 273 38
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Chart 48: Coverage of mortgage loans of the banking sector, 
June 2012 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 49: Ratio of non-performing loans at financial 
enterprises by ownership structure 
 
Note: Domestic banks category includes all financial 
enterprises owned by banks registered in Hungary. 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
the picture is refined by several factors. Depreciation 
of the forint may raise the size of the loan compared 
to the collateral value. In addition, the exact value 
of collateral is also uncertain, due to its relatively 
infrequent appraisal. However, the collateral is often 
taken into account with a sizeable „haircut‟. 
Nevertheless, in the case of restructured mortgage 
loans past due less than 90 days, the exposure 
exceeds the value of the collateral and the loan loss 
reserves, particularly in the case of the Swiss franc 
loans (Chart 48). The difference may pose a risk, as 
the performance of restructured loans is 
deteriorating steadily. 
In order to mitigate risks and accelerate portfolio 
cleaning it is necessary to tighten loan loss 
provisioning and collateral appraisal rules. Based on 
the above arguments, banks presumably use 
restructuring not only for the improvement of 
solvency, but also for smoothing the booking of the 
necessary loan loss provisions. However, with a 
deteriorating economic environment this may result 
in a shock-like appearance of tensions in the 
portfolio. In order to avoid this, the issue of revising 
loan loss provisioning and collateral appraisal rules 
should be addressed again. 
Deteriorating portfolio quality at financial 
enterprises, stagnation at cooperative credit 
institutions 
The portfolio quality of financial enterprises 
deteriorated considerably in H1. At end-2011, some 
deceleration was perceived in the rise of non-
performing loans to the total portfolio. However, this 
did not represent a real turning point. The share of 
NPLs within the portfolio increased significantly 
during the first half of the year. At end-June, the 
indicator was close to 28 per cent (Chart 49). 
Simultaneously, the cost of provisioning also 
increased from 3.5 per cent at the end of the year to 
3.7 per cent at mid-year. This was reflected in the 
coverage as well. Following a 3 percentage point 
rise, the loan loss coverage reached 62 per cent. It is 
notably higher than in the banking sector, although 
at the same time it has to be taken into account that 
collateral coverage is significantly lower in the 
portfolio of financial enterprises than in that of 
banks. 
The credit quality of household loans improved in 
the portfolio of cooperative credit institutions, 
while a slight deterioration was observed in the 
case of corporate loans. The deterioration in the 
corporate portfolio quality of cooperative credit 
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Table 4: Key indicators of corporate portfolio quality at 
cooperative credit institutions 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
Table 5: Key indicators of household portfolio quality at 
cooperative credit institutions 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
institutions continued in H1, although only to a minor 
extent. However, the half-year value of around 27 
per cent is considered very high (Table 4). Moreover, 
a stronger increase would have occurred if one 
institution had not been excluded from the 
observation due to liquidation proceedings. 
Notwithstanding this slight deterioration, there was 
no material change in the cost of provisioning. As a 
result, an overall improvement took place in the loan 
loss coverage of non-performing loans. As regards the 
household portfolio, an improvement was observed 
(Table 5), which was also attributable to a change in 
the aforementioned decrease in the number of 
institutions. In addition, the decline in the NPL ratio 
was facilitated by an increase in the household 
portfolio of the sector, which is basically attributable 
to the new loans extended for early repayments 
during the scheme. Overall, the ratio of non-
performing loans within the sector amounted to 15.5 
per cent at the end of the period. The improvement 
reduced the need for loan loss provisioning as well, 
i.e. the loss on this portfolio was lower. 
4. BANK LIQUIDITY – The outflow of foreign funds remains accelerated, while 
swap market exposure is still high, despite some moderation  
In 2012, deleveraging of the domestic banking sector continued, and the loan-to-deposit ratio declined close to 
the European average. In order to avoid excessive outflow of external funds and the subsequent strong 
deleveraging a new commitment, similar to the ‘Vienna Initiative’, by parent banks would be of particular 
importance. The FX swap exposure of the banking sector declined steadily in 2012, but its level is still high. The 
MNB initiated that banks should reduce and keep their off-balance-sheet open positions to total assets under 15 
per cent. 
 
Chart 50: The loan-to-deposit ratio in international comparison 
 
Source: ECB. 
Despite considerable improvement, the loan-to-
deposit ratio may decrease further. As a result of 
the strong deleveraging of the banking sector, by 
July 2012 the loan-to-deposit ratio reached the 
approximately 120 per cent level observed in most 
of the countries of the European Union. There are 
significant differences in the adjustment processes 
across countries. While in Hungary it was mainly the 
amount of loans outstanding that declined since end-
2008 (largely due early repayments), in the other 
countries of the region it is mostly the total amount 
of deposits that increased. In spite of the intensive 
adjustment (Chart 50), the loan-to-deposit ratio of 
the Hungarian banking sector cannot be considered 
low in regional comparison, while there is 
substantial asymmetry among banks. Therefore, the 
loan-to-deposit ratio may decrease further. 
Percent 2008 2009
2010 
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2010 
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2011 
H1
2011
H2
2012 
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Share of 90 days past 
due loans to total 
loans
12.8 13.8 17.8 17.3 25.0 25.9 26.9
Coverage ratio 40.9 42.9 35.0 35.2 30.4 32.2 35.6
Loan loss provisioning 
as a percentage of 
total loans
1.2 1.3 - 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.0
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Chart 51: Foreign funds and the loan-to-deposit ratio, as well 
as their forecast 
 
Note: The forecasts are based on the spring 2012 Report on Financial 
Stability.  
Source: MNB. 
Chart 52: Cumulated change of foreign funds in selected CEE 
countries’ banking sector (Dec 2011 = 0) 
  
Source: ECB. 
Chart 53: Foreign funds of the banking sector and the share of 
parent bank funds within foreign funds total 
 
Source: MNB. 
In order to reduce the steady withdrawal of 
external funds, stronger parent bank commitment 
would be necessary. Apart from temporary impacts, 
the decline in external funds of the banking sector 
continued this year as well, by a total EUR 4 billion 
until August 2012 (Chart 51). Due to their restrained 
activity, banks used only a part of the liquidity 
stemming from the early repayment scheme for the 
disbursement of new loans, while using most of it to 
repay foreign liabilities. Starting from Q3, the 
outflow of funds began to accelerate again, and thus 
the pessimistic forecast may materialise by the end 
of the year, i.e. external funds of the banking sector 
may fall by as much as EUR 6 billion in 2012. The 
increasing tax burden of the banking sector poses 
risks as the outflow of external funds may be more 
accelerated than our previous anticipation. 
The outflow of external funds until August cannot 
be considered a country-specific development in a 
regional comparison. From 2011 Q4 to 2012 Q1, 
departing from regional developments, the outflow 
of external funds from the Hungarian banking sector 
accelerated considerably, attributable to a great 
extent to the early repayment scheme. However, as 
of 2012 Q2 the outflow of external funds has also 
accelerated in other regional countries: external 
funds of the banking system decreased to similar 
extent in Romania and Poland (Chart 52). 
The share of parent bank funding declined 
markedly this year compared to previous periods. 
The proportion of parent bank funds has been 
declining steadily since the end of last year: at 
present, the ratio of parent bank funding is 56 per 
cent in the banking sector, following an 8 
percentage point decline since the beginning of the 
year, whereas in the case of banks that have foreign 
owners this ratio fell from 77 per cent at the end of 
last year to 70 per cent by June 2012 (Chart 53). 
The outflow of external funds does not translate 
into liquidity tensions, but may contribute to 
persistently weak lending activity. One favourable 
development is that the dynamic outflow of external 
funds is not leading to liquidity tensions, as the 
appreciation of the forint and the decrease in CDS 
spreads and in FX swap exposure offset the negative 
effects. At the same time, the causality between the 
outflow of external funds and the contraction in 
lending can easily intensify again. In order to avoid 
strong deleveraging, it is thus still important to 
achieve a Vienna Initiative-type agreement on 
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Chart 54: Government securities holdings of households and 
deposits of the private sector (cumulative net changes 
compared to end-2010) 
 
Note: * contains the bank deposits of money market funds as well. 
Source: Government Debt Management Agency (ÁKK) and MNB. 
parent banks‟ commitment that can be related to 
the EU/IMF agreement. 
The increase in domestic deposits is slow; 
therefore, the reliance of the Hungarian banking 
sector on external funds may remain strong over 
the long term. Due to the fragile external 
environment, it is extremely important for the 
economy that banks obtain adequate amounts of 
stable domestic funds. Compared to end-2010, until 
the early repayment scheme, total deposits of the 
private sector had increased by some HUF 600 
billion, which flowed out of the banking sector 
mainly as a result of the early repayment. In the 
period since then, however, the increase in private 
deposits has remained moderate. All this implies 
continued reliance of the banking sector on external 
funds. 
The stronger role of the state in the competition 
for savings may also slow down the adjustment of 
funding models in the banking sector. In recent 
months, the state has also raised competition for 
domestic funds, which is reflected in increased 
marketing as well as in attractive interest rate 
conditions. As a result, since early 2012 households‟ 
government securities holdings have increased by 
some HUF 250-300 billion (Chart 54). According to 
the latest information, the government plans to 
issue retail FX-denominated securities in the near 
future that may also weaken funding position of the 
banking sector. At the same time, a partial 
rechanneling of households‟ cash holdings, which are 
high in international comparison, into the banking 
sector may contribute to an increase in domestic 
banks‟ funds (Box 9). 
 
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
D
e
c
-1
0
J
a
n
-1
1
F
e
b
M
a
r
A
p
r
M
a
y
J
u
n
J
u
l
A
u
g
S
e
p
O
c
t
N
o
v
D
e
c
J
a
n
-1
2
F
e
b
M
a
r
A
p
r
M
a
y
J
u
n
J
u
l
HUF BnHUF Bn
Households' government securities holdings
Private sector's deposits*
Early repayment scheme
  49/79 
BOX 9: EXPECTED IMPACT OF CHANNELLING CASH HOLDINGS INTO THE BANKING SYSTEM 
The changing state and bank funding model following the crisis intends to increasingly rely on households‟ 
savings. At the same time, household deposits of banks have only increased slightly to date, and thus over the 
short run the banking sector could rather obtain 
additional funds via a realignment of household 
savings. One of the most obvious ways could be the 
channelling of the cash held by economic agents 
into the banking system and into direct state 
financing. 
Cash holdings in the Hungarian economy have 
increased considerably in the recent period. Even 
though nominal cash holdings increase in parallel 
with economic growth and inflation, in the past 
years the cash demand of the Hungarian economy 
grew to a greater extent than justified. 
The cash holdings of economic agents can be split 
up into two parts according to function:30 cash 
holdings for transactions and for hoarding purposes. Transactional cash demand indicates the amount of cash 
necessary for performing the daily goods and services turnover. Its size is determined by the payment and 
banking infrastructure available in the given economy and the payment habits of economic agents (number of 
ATMs, POS terminals and bank branches, number of bank cards and bank accounts, number of payments by bank 
card, etc.). In addition to the transaction cash holding, economic agents may set aside a part of their savings as 
well in cash; in this case the hoarding motive prevails, typically influenced by the opportunity cost of cash 
holdings (deposit rates), financial literacy and the size of the black/grey economy. Based on the financial 
account statistics of the MNB, most domestic cash holdings (approximately 80–85 per cent) are held by 
households.31 
The cash demand of the Hungarian economy is rather high in international comparison, not only compared to 
West European countries where financial culture is 
more developed, but also to the average of Central 
Eastern European countries.32 By separating transaction 
purpose cash demand from the total cash holdings in 
the Central Eastern European countries, the cash 
holding for hoarding of the Hungarian economy 
becomes comparable to that of the peer group. 
Assuming that cash holdings for a hoarding purpose in 
Hungary may sink to the level of the Central Eastern 
European average, around HUF 400 billion could be 
channelled into the domestic banking system. As a 
result, household deposits in the banking sector could 
increase by approximately 6.3 per cent. 
Channelling a part of domestic cash holdings into the 
banking system would have different impacts on the 
various economic sectors. It would have a clearly positive impact from the banking sector‟s point of view, as bank 
funding (increasing deposits) and profitability (deposit margin, other revenues from fees) would improve. 
                                                 
30 For details see: Balázs Sisak (2011): What drives cash demand?, MNB WP; Humphrey, D., A. Kaloudis and G. Øwre (2000): Forecasting cash use 
in legal and illegal activities, Working paper, Central Bank of Norway; Snellman, J. S., J. M. Vesala and D.  Humphrey (2001): Substitution of 
non-cash payment instruments for cash in Europe, Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 19 No. 2−3, pp. 131−145. 
31 In connection with these data it is important to emphasise that the cash holdings of households is determined in the national statistics using 
the residual principle; accordingly, the cash holdings of the black/grey economy may also appear here. 
32 Balázs Sisak (2011): What drives cash demand?, MNB WP. 
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2,000
2,200
2,400
2,600
2,800
2
0
0
1
 Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
2
 Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
3
 Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
4
 Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
5
 Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
6
 Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
7
 Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
8
 Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
9
 Q
1
Q
3
2
0
1
0
 Q
1
Q
3
2
0
1
1
 Q
1
Q
3
2
0
1
2
 Q
1
per centHUF Bn
Cash holdings in the economy
Curreny in circulation
Currency in circulation in relation to GDP (RHS)
Source: MNB.
Note: Quarterly average value of cash holdings, seasonally adjusted.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
P
o
la
n
d
R
o
m
a
n
ia
L
a
tv
ia
L
it
h
u
a
n
ia
C
z
e
c
h
R
e
p
u
b
li
c
B
u
lg
a
ri
a
H
u
n
g
a
ry
per centper cent
Cash holdings for transaction and hoarding purposes as a 
proportion of GDP (based on end-2011 data)
Hoarding cash demand
Transactional cash demand
CEE-average of hoarding cash demand
Source: Own calculation based on ECB data, MNB.
Note:  Transaction cash holdings estimated on the basis of Sisak (2011). Cash holdings for a hoarding 
purpose also contain the cash demand related to the hidden economy. CEE average calculated on 
the basis of Polish, Bulgarian, Romanian and Czech data.
  50/79 
Channelling the cash into the banking system would be advantageous for households as well, as they would 
realise interest income on their savings instead of holding cash interest free. If banks would increase their credit 
supply owing to the additional funds, access of companies to credit could also improve, contributing to economic 
growth as well. From the state‟s point of view there would be two contrasting effects: banks could also use their 
additional funds to buy government securities, which would have a positive effect on yields; at the same time, 
the seigniorage revenue of the state through the central bank would decline. 
In order to reduce cash holdings, several European countries have introduced regulations to reduce cash 
payments, while encouraging electronic payment. One of the most widespread solutions is that cash payments 
are restricted to some limit, although its size and scope (corporate and/or retail transactions) vary significantly 
across countries. Other typical regulations include the rule of meeting tax payment obligations through transfers, 
the mandatory transfer of salaries and government transfers to bank accounts and also the introduction of the 
related basic account. 
 
In order to channel a part of cash holdings into the banking system, the introduction of a comprehensive 
regulatory package aimed at containing cash payment would be worth considering in Hungary. In the case of 
companies, several regulations already exist33 or are expected to enter into force in the near future,34 but for 
households, the legislation is still rather incomplete. Incentives affecting transactions money demand may, over 
the long term, also result in an improvement in households‟ financing capacity within the banking system.35 
As a basic element of the regulatory package for households it would be worth introducing a compulsory basic 
account scheme. Citizens – typically without bank account previously – who meet predetermined conditions could 
open a bank account for a minimum fee (or even free of charge) and with basic payment services at any bank and 
could use this account to perform their payment transactions. If the payment and bank infrastructure (number of 
POS terminals, availability of bank branches, development of Internet penetration and the system that accepts 
electronic payments,36 etc.) allows it in the future, the compulsory transfer of salaries and state transfers to 
bank accounts and the limiting of cash payments may be the next steps in shaping an economy which relies on 
cash to a lesser extent. The current draft of the transactional tax legislation represents a significant move 
towards a reduction of cash payment transactions, as a significant higher tax rate would/will be imposed on cash 
payments than on non-cash transfers. Since the financial institutions are liable to pay the tax, the desired impact 
can be only obtained, if the banks will pass on the tax on cash payments and not on other services. 
 
  
                                                 
33 As of 1 November 2009, economic organisations must have a current account, and they also have to meet their tax payment obligations from 
this account (for details, see Act XCII of 2003 on the Rules of Taxation). 
34 According to a bill not yet adopted by the National Assembly, as of 1 January 2013, enterprises will not be allowed to pay more than HUF 1.5 
million in cash in a calendar month on the basis of the same one contract. 
35 In recent years, the MNB has drafted several proposals to reduce the use of cash and encourage the use of electronic modes of payment, and 
is currently discussing a number of issues with government agencies and market participants concerned as well. The proposals are presented in 
detail in the MNB publication „Jelentés a fizetési rendszerrõl‟ (Report on the Payment System) (2012). 
36 This may include a reduction of retailers‟ costs related to purchases by card, the implementation of a tender that supports the installation of 
POS terminals or the gradual introduction of the mandatory acceptance of payment cards in retail trade. 
Limitations on payments in cash
BE, FR, DK, LT, FI, BG, ES,
(IT: suspended at present),
(HU: proposal waiting for adoption)
Meeting tax payment obligations by cashless payment DE, GR, NL, UK, HU (applies to companies only)
Introduction of basic account BE, FR, DE, UK, NO
Mandatory transfer of state transfers to bank account FR, DE, UK
Mandatory transfer of salaries to bank account NO, HU (applies to civil servants only)
Source: MNB collection.
Regulations encouraging the reduction of the use of cash in selected European countries
  51/79 
Chart 55: Five-year CDS spreads of parent banks and Hungary 
 
Source: Bloomberg. 
Chart 56: Decomposition of the change in the on-balance-sheet  
FX position of the banking sector 
 
Note: Composition effect: clients change the denomination composition 
of their loans or deposits. Volume effect: the on-balance-sheet FX 
position changes as a result of items that are coupled with increases or 
decreases in the balance sheet total. Exchange rate effect: the value of 
on-balance-sheet foreign exchange assets and liabilities expressed in 
forints changes as a result of changes in foreign-exchange rates. 
Source: MNB. 
Chart 57: Average remaining maturity of foreign funds and 
gross foreign FX swaps 
 
Source: MNB. 
Despite a sharp decline, funding costs remain 
high, putting pressure on profitability. Although 
the sovereign Hungarian and parent bank CDS 
spreads, which determine funding costs, have fallen 
significantly since 2012 Q2, their levels remains 
elevated (Chart 55). In spite of a decline in spreads, 
on-balance-sheet foreign currency denominated 
funds remain expensive for domestic banks. 
Therefore, in terms of profitability, obtaining 
foreign exchange liquidity through FX swap 
transactions may remain a more lucrative alternative 
for them. 
Notwithstanding the steady outflow of external 
funds, the net FX swap exposure of the banking 
sector continued to decline. The exchange rate 
effect and the composition effect played a key role 
in the approximately HUF 500 billion fall in holdings 
observed since end-March. The volume effect did 
not affect the on-balance-sheet open foreign 
exchange position considerably, in spite of the fact 
that banks had repaid their foreign currency 
denominated liabilities before an adequate quantity 
of foreign currency loans matured on the asset side. 
This is attributable to the fact that the exposure 
increasing effect of the outflow of external funds 
was completely offset by clients‟ increasing foreign 
currency deposits and the decline in margin 
requirements due to exchange rate appreciation 
(Chart 56). 
One favourable development is that the average 
remaining maturity of FX swaps outstanding 
increased considerably, thus mitigating the roll-
over risk of swap transactions. This phenomenon 
may be primarily attributable to the introduction of 
the foreign exchange funding adequacy ratio (FFAR) 
in July. During the preparation, many banks 
concluded transactions with maturities of over one 
year in several steps, thus adding to the stable 
foreign currency funds and reducing roll-over risks 
(Chart 57). 
Banks succeeded in catching up with the FFAR 
regulation mainly by extending the maturities of 
swap transactions. The majority of banks affected 
by the regulation started the adjustment to reach 
the 65 per cent minimum level in 2012 Q2. The 
process of catching up was the most intensive in 
June, while in July only a minor improvement was 
observed in the maturity mismatch. Accordingly, the 
average FFAR of the banking sector has improved by 
13 percentage points since March. Decomposition of 
the adjustment process reveals that banks mostly 
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Chart 58: Decomposition of the change in the FFAR of the 
banking sector (exchange rate adjusted, change calculated 
since end-March) 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
Chart 59: On-balance-sheet position of the banking sector and 
the proportion of banks which exceed the 15 per cent limit as a 
percentage of the balance sheet total 
 
Source: MNB 
increased their FX swap exposure with a maturity of 
over one year. In addition, the decline in foreign 
currency denominated assets also played an 
important role. The expansion of on-balance-sheet 
stable foreign currency liabilities contributed to the 
improvement in the indicator only to a lesser extent 
(Chart 58). Upon entry into force of the regulation, 
99 per cent of the banking sector on the basis of 
balance sheet total complied with the expected 
level; only three small banks did not reach the 
minimum level. 
At the same time, the still high swap exposure of 
domestic banks poses a considerable systemic risk. 
Our econometric calculations show that the critical 
level of domestic banks‟ swap exposure is around 
HUF 3,000–3,200 billion (EUR 10–12.5 billion), above 
which systemic risk may intensify. Based on model 
results, in the past the FX swap exposure amplified 
the negative effect of external shocks on the 
exchange rate and the volatility of the forint above 
these levels (Box 10). The central bank started 
negotiations with commercial banks so that the 
banking sector‟s FX swap exposure does not exceed 
the above-mentioned critical level. The central 
bank‟s goal is that commercial banks keep their FX 
swap exposure (or more precisely their off-balance 
sheet open FX position) under 15 per cent to total 
assets37 (Chart 59). 
 
  
                                                 
37 The positive/negative values refer to off-balance sheet net long/short HUF position. 
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BOX 10: WHAT DEGREE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE SWAP EXPOSURE MAY POSE A FINANCIAL STABILITY RISK? 
The high swap exposure of domestic banks jeopardises the stability of the financial system for several reasons. 
Firstly, the maturity of banks‟ foreign exchange funding through swaps is typically shorter than that of external 
funds, increasing the maturity mismatch of credit institutions. Secondly, in the case of significant forint 
depreciation the margin call requirement of swaps causes a strong foreign exchange liquidity shock to the 
banking sector. In such cases, the transmission of monetary policy may become impaired, as implied forint yields 
may decline and may deviate from MNB interest rates. As a result, taking up short forint positions may become 
cheaper, exacerbating front depreciation. The greater the swap exposure, the stronger negative spiral that may 
start up, adding to the size of the shock to the economy as a whole. Using econometric estimates, we attempted 
to model this mechanism. 
With the help of OLS and GARCH models, applying so-called dummy variables, we tried to determine the critical 
level of the swap exposure above which – in the case of an external, unfavourable risk premium shock – negative 
feedback cycles leading to further depreciation may 
begin. The mechanism of the negative spiral is as 
follows: following the exchange rate depreciation 
effect of the shock, the margin call requirement for 
banks with swap exposures surges, resulting in higher 
foreign exchange demand of credit institutions. The 
mounting demand for foreign exchange may put 
downward pressure on the forint exchange rate, and 
the depreciation increases bank‟ margin call 
requirements further. The second-round effect on the 
exchange rate may be significant when the swap 
exposure is high, because then the rise in foreign 
exchange demand of banks is considerable compared 
to the turnover in the foreign exchange market.  
We assume that the swap exposure has a threshold 
above which the demand for foreign exchange that surges due to the increase in the margin call requirement 
results in a major depreciation of the exchange rate. For the estimation of this threshold, we tried to explain the 
change in/volatility of the EUR/HUF exchange rate with, inter alia, the level of the swap exposure, the change in 
the VIX index (a proxy widely used for global risk appetite), the change in the EUR/USD exchange rate and the 
changes in the EUR/HUF exchange rate observed in previous periods. The threshold was determined based on the 
levels where the swap exposure as explanatory variable was the most significant, taking into account at which 
levels the value of the coefficient and the explanatory power of the model were higher. Based on the results of 
the OLS models, these factors jointly indicate that the critical level is at a swap exposure of EUR 10–12.6 billion, 
whereas according to the GARCH models it is between EUR 11.6–12.2 billion. This amount represents 
approximately 15 per cent of the balance sheet total of the banks operating in Hungary. 
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5. PROFITABILITY AND CAPITAL ADEQUACY – The high interest margin is able to 
offset negative shocks to a great extent, however over the longer term it 
may amplify the procyclical behaviour of the banking sector 
The pre-tax income of the banking sector has reached a 15-year low, while there is considerable asymmetry in 
profitability: the aggregate pre-tax profit of HUF 11 billion is the result of profits amounting to HUF 96 billion 
and losses amounting to HUF 85 billion. At the same time, the interest margin of the banking sector is extremely 
high in international comparison, and if costs decline this may ensure restoration of the favourable profitability 
of the Hungarian banking sector in regional comparison. Despite our previous expectations that restoration would 
take place till 2013, it will be delayed. First the full amount of bank levy has been upheld and the rate of 
financial transaction tax has been doubled. Second, the risk of additional loan loss provisioning needs on 
outstanding loans is elevated. All these may translate into higher interest rate margin aimed at offsetting the 
losses.  Over the longer term, however, the high interest margin is undesirable in terms of financial stability, as 
it means a greater debt servicing burden for clients, which may lead to a negative spiral through additional 
portfolio quality deterioration. 
The capital adequacy ratio shows strong shock-absorbing capacity at banking sector level. Although the sector-
level CAR is nearly double the regulatory minimum, capital buffers remain highly concentrated, while retained 
earnings capacity is weak.   
Chart 60: Aggregate pre-tax profit of the banking sector and 
branches 
 
Source: MNB. 
Chart 61: Pre-tax loss and profit of banks and branches 
cumulated on individual level (June 2012) 
 
Source: MNB. 
The pre-tax profit of the banking sector in the first 
half of the year was the lowest in the last 15 years. 
At end-June 2012, the total pre-tax profit of the 
banking sector and branches amounted to HUF 11 
billion (Chart 60). This was the weakest performance 
in the last 15 years, and is well below the profit of 
HUF 178 billion recorded in the previous year. 
Looking at developments in the pre-tax profit, a 
considerable fall occurred in June 2012 owing to the 
one-off settlements of two banks. The pre-tax 12-
month rolling profitability indicators are in the 
negative territory; at end-June ROE was -14.3, while 
ROA was -1.2 per cent. 
Asymmetry in profitability remains high. Although 
the asymmetry in profitability narrowed somewhat, it 
is the result of declining profit of profitable banks. 
54 per cent of the gross profit of the banking sector 
continues to be related to the three most profitable 
banks. The loss is also extremely concentrated; three 
banks are responsible for three quarters of it, while 
the majority of banks are characterised by a profit of 
around zero. The pre-tax profit of HUF 11 billion of 
the banking sector is the result of profits amounting 
to HUF 96 billion and losses amounting to HUF 85 
billion (Chart 61). 
Profitability indicators are low in international 
comparison as well. A review of a longer period 
reveals that the current level of the after-tax ROE is 
well below that of the countries of parent banks and 
of the peer countries in the region that compete with 
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Chart 62: Banking sector ROE in international comparison 
 
Note: Based on IMF GFSR data, calculated from consolidated after-tax 
profits. 
Source: IMF and MNB. 
Chart 63: Aggregate 12-month main rolling profit items of the 
banking sector and branches as a proportion of the 12-month 
average balance sheet total 
 
Source: MNB. 
Chart 64: Net interest income as a proportion of the balance 
sheet total of selected banking sectors at end-2011 
 
Source: ECB CBD database. 
 
Hungary for foreign funds (Chart 62). 
A significant portion of the income stems from net 
interest income. Comparing the data of the banking 
sector on a 12-month rolling time series to the 12-
month average total assets shows that net interest 
income – although its volume and ratio have declined 
– remains the largest and at the same time most 
stable source of income of the banking sector. The 
ratio of profit from net fees and commissions as well 
as the profit from trading income has not changed 
considerably compared to last year. Losses suffered 
on other income continued to grow in 2012 Q2 as 
well, which is attributable to the provisioning of two 
banks for derivative transactions amounting to HUF 
80 billion and goodwill write-offs. There was a slight 
decline in operating costs, but their weight did not 
change significantly. The ratio of loan loss 
provisioning remained unchanged compared to the 
previous quarter (Chart 63). 
The ratio of the net interest income of the 
domestic banking sector to total assets is the 
highest in regional comparison. In evaluating the 
high net interest income (Chart 64), it deserves 
special attention that due to default nearly one fifth 
of the portfolio does not produce any interest at all. 
Reaching this high level in international comparison 
is basically attributable to the higher interest margin 
and the significantly lower interbank activity. In 
addition, in the case of domestic banks a much 
greater portion of revenues is related to interest 
income than in more developed states, where the net 
fee and commission plays a much more important 
role. However, for lack of alternative sources of 
income, banks aim to maintain the high interest 
margins over the long term in the household segment 
both in the case of foreign currency denominated 
mortgage loans and the newly granted mainly 
subsidised HUF-denominated mortgage loans. By 
contrast, corporate lending is characterised by high 
price competition, and accordingly the interest 
margin is not the most important motivation for 
banks. 
Transparent pricing failed to materialise for 
outstanding loans. Pursuant to the decree regulating 
transparent pricing, as of April 2012, banks can only 
extend loans with a reference base and fixed 
premium or fixed loans in terms of the total interest 
to households. As a result, banks are allowed to 
amend their lending rates on outstanding loans only 
in very limited cases. Banks have applied this 
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Chart 65: Profit after tax, dividend and capital increases of 
existing foreign-owned banks 
 
Note: In the dividend disbursement ratio, the dividends were taken 
into account only to the extent of the profit of the given year. 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regulation to new loans. However, the interest rate 
conditions of loans outstanding have not become 
transparent. Banks were required to offer a new loan 
product with transparent pricing before end-August 
2012 to enable clients to replace their old products 
whose pricing was non-transparent. However, banks 
extended new loans at higher prices than the old 
ones. Therefore, clients did not refinance loans, and 
thus the pricing of foreign currency denominated 
mortgage loans outstanding remains non-transparent. 
The solution could be if the regulation on transparent 
pricing on outstanding mortgage loans would be 
extended up to the maturity of loans. 
The high margin may stabilise profitability over the 
short run, but might be unsustainable over the long 
term. The high interest margin attributable to 
pricing dominance in the case of foreign currency 
denominated mortgage loans outstanding is able to 
shield banks from substantial capital losses over the 
short run by offsetting the bank levy, burdens and 
loan losses. At the same time, the high interest 
margin translates into a higher debt servicing burden 
for clients, which affects deteriorating portfolio 
quality and results in lower consumption and 
economic growth. This may trigger a negative spiral 
and amplify procyclicality: via deteriorating portfolio 
quality and a rising interest margin to offset this. All 
this may undermine the capital position of the 
banking sector over the medium and longer term. 
This risk could be managed by reducing the tax 
burdens on the domestic banking sector, thereby 
restoring the profitability of the financial system 
over the medium term, and helping to break the 
negative spiral between the interest margin and 
portfolio deterioration. 
In the pre-crisis years, foreign-owned credit 
institutions reinvested the greater portion of their 
after-tax profits and raised capital in the case of 
losses. In the pre-crisis period, foreign-owned banks 
withdrew an average 30 per cent of the profit as 
dividends (Chart 65). However, for several large 
banks the substantial capital injections (parent 
banks‟ EUR 2.4 billion capital injection from early 
2009) essential following the crisis considerably 
exceeded the dividends disbursed during previous 
years. A typical strategy of certain banks was that 
they raised capital from the dividend disbursed, i.e. 
they reinvested it into the affiliate bank. Thus, the 
commitment of the foreign parent banks to provide 
the necessary capital largely contributed to the 
stability of the domestic financial system. 
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Chart 66: CAR and SREP CAR of the banking sector 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
Chart 67: Capital buffer of the banking sector  (end June 2012) 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Pre-tax profit/loss of financial enterprises 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
 
The capital adequacy ratio shows strong shock-
absorbing capacity at banking sector level. The CAR 
increased to 14.8 per cent by end-June 2012. Some of 
the increase in Q1 is attributable to an increase in 
capital (capital injection) and some of it to the 
decline in capital requirement stemming from 
contraction in loans outstanding (impact of the early 
repayment scheme). The minimal increase in Q2 at 
the system level was caused by an increase in the 
mid-year audited profit and a decline in loans 
outstanding. The ratio is also influenced by the 
exchange rate volatility; depreciation reduces the 
ratio (Chart 66). 
Although the sector-level indicator is nearly double 
the regulatory minimum, capital buffers are 
concentrated. The banks with the five largest buffers 
account for more than 40 per cent of the banking 
sector capital buffer. While the total regulatory 
capital buffer exceeds the minimum regulatory 
capital buffer by 85 per cent, in the case of the SREP 
it is 38 per cent, indicating a more stretched, but still 
strong capital position (Chart 67). The indicator of 
one bank was slightly below 9 per cent due to mid-
year losses, while all banks complied with the SREP 
requirements. 
Financial enterprises owned by banks remain 
unprofitable. Based on H1 data, the pre-tax loss of 
the sector amounted to HUF 11 billion, resulting from 
the HUF 15 billion loss of bank-owned financial 
enterprises and the pre-tax profit of HUF 4 billion of 
non-bank enterprises (Table 6). Enterprises owned by 
banks restrained their activity considerably; as a 
result, the deteriorating portfolio is making losses 
steadily. Some banks decided to merge their 
affiliated firms, and so this market segment is 
expected to shrink further. 
The half-year pre-tax profit of cooperative credit 
institutions is close to the level of last year as a 
whole. The half-year pre-tax profit of cooperative 
credit institutions amounted to HUF 6.2 billion, which 
exceeds by 50 per cent the profit of the last year‟s 
same period. The source of growth is an increase in 
interest income and a drop in loan loss provisioning. 
Provisioning is traditionally lower in this sector due to 
the smaller proportion of corporate and household 
lending and of lending in foreign currency. The 
profitability ratio of the sector is much better than 
that of the banking sector; the ROE amounted to 6.9 
per cent in June (Chart 68). 
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Chart 68: CAR and ROE indicators and pre-tax profit of 
cooperative credit institutions
 
Source: MNB. 
The capital adequacy of cooperative credit 
institutions is adequate at the sector level, but 
conceals strong asymmetry. The 15.7 per cent 
capital adequacy ratio of the cooperative credit 
institutions sector at end-June 2012 indicates an 
adequate capital position at the aggregate level for 
the sector. However, similarly to the banking sector, 
it masks strong asymmetry. The capital requirement 
will increase as cooperative credit institutions 
without an institutional protection fund of a quality 
required by the HFSA may be required to set aside 
substantial additional capital of up to 50 per cent due 
to the SREP. At present, the SREP CAR is 11.6 per 
cent (Chart 68). 
 
6. LIQUIDITY AND SOLVENCY STRESS TESTS – Both liquidity and solvency 
stress tests show strong resilience 
The results of liquidity and solvency stress tests indicate an improvement in the shock-absorbing capacity of the 
banking sector. In the event of a low-probability, severely negative scenario involving the simultaneous 
occurrence of financial market turbulence, deposit withdrawals and an exchange rate shock, banks’ liquidity 
reserves remain adequate; thus the value of the Liquidity Stress Index is low. As liquidity reserves are mostly 
denominated in forints, in a protracted stress situation one fundamental condition for stable liquidity is the 
smooth functioning of the FX swap market. 
As a result of capital injections by parent banks at end-2011 and this year as well as the steady deleveraging, 
the capital position of the banking sector has strengthened markedly. This improvement is confirmed by the 
Solvency Stress Index as well; its current level can be considered adequate. Even in the stress scenario 
accounting for additional losses on outstanding non-performing loan portfolio as well and the higher tax burden, 
only one major bank has a capital need over the two-year time horizon, and the magnitude of the total capital 
need of the banking sector is also manageable, amounting to HUF 28 billion. In addition, a positive change is 
that the banking sector would be able to weather even a severe shock with a greater capital buffer than half a 
year earlier. 
Chart 69: 30-day liquidity surplus as a proportion of balance 
sheet total by currencies 
 
Source: MNB. 
Based on the stress test, the liquidity shock-
absorbing capacity of the banking sector has 
strengthened 
Banks’ short-term liquidity is adequate, but mostly 
denominated in forints. The level of 30-day forward 
looking liquidity surpluses rose steadily in the past 
half year, departing from the regulatory limit of 10 
per cent to total assets. The banking sector has much 
higher liquidity buffers than the required level. 
However, their distribution is asymmetrical and they 
are mostly denominated in forints (Chart 69). 
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Table 7: Main parameters of the liquidity stress test 
 
Note: The forward-looking treasury gap assumes no active treasury 
management on the part of the bank; hence it does not take into 
account rollovers of maturing interbank and foreign funds. 
Source: MNB. 
 
Chart 70: 30-day stress liquidity surplus as a proportion of 
balance sheet total by currencies 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
Chart 71: Liquidity Stress Index, and banks’ liquidity surplus or 
deficit relative to the regulatory level in the stress scenario 
 
Note: The LSI is the sum of normalised liquidity deficits relative to the 
10 per cent level, weighted by the balance sheet total. The higher the 
value of the index, the higher the liquidity risk in the stress scenario. 
Source: MNB. 
The short-term liquidity stress test measures the 
effect of an assumed simultaneous occurrence of 
financial market turmoil, deposit withdrawal and 
exchange rate shock. In determining household and 
corporate deposit withdrawals and the price decline 
of eligible securities, we applied so-called value-at-
risk (VaR) type stresses calculated on the basis of 
historical data. The magnitude of the exchange rate 
shock is consistent with the data of our macro stress 
scenario. Crisis experiences were taken as a basis for 
determining the other stress measures (Table 7). 
The liquidity surplus of banks after stress is 
adequate, although forint reserves dominate in this 
case as well. The 30-day forward-looking stressed 
liquidity surplus increased in 2012, and its magnitude 
was above the required level. Forint liquidity 
continues to dominate, while the shortage of foreign 
exchange declined to around zero at the banking 
sector level (Chart 70). At the same time, in a 
protracted stress situation, the fundamental 
condition of the stability of liquidity is the smooth 
functioning of the FX swap market. 
The Liquidity Stress Index shows a low value. The 
Liquidity Stress Index shows to what extent the 
liquidity buffer of banks falls short of the regulatory 
limit of 10 per cent to total assets, and the number of 
banks experiencing a shortfall. Taking account of the 
extent of the deviation from the regulatory limit as 
well, and then weighted by the balance sheet total of 
banks, the value of the index amounts to 6.8 per 
cent. This means that if the stress scenario took 
place, the banking sector would be only slightly 
below the regulatory minimum. It is favourable that 
no bank would fall below zero; in other words each 
bank would remain liquid even in a stress situation 
(Chart 71). It is important to emphasise that there 
was an increase in stressed liquidity buffers 
aggregated by banks, while shortfalls declined during 
the year. 
Due to capital injections by parent banks and 
deleveraging, the solvency stress test of banks 
shows stronger resilience 
We expect a significant economic downturn, 
exchange rate and interest rate shocks and 
additional losses on outstanding non-performing 
portfolio in the stress scenario of the solvency 
stress test. The current macroeconomic baseline 
scenario is identical with the forecast published in 
the September issue of the Quarterly Report on 
Inflation. This scenario projects a gloomier economic 
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Chart 72: GDP growth rate in the scenarios (year-on-year) 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 73: Loan loss rate in the previous four quarters for the 
corporate portfolio in the stress scenario 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
outlook for 2012 and 2013 than we used in the spring 
issue of the Report on Financial Stability. While the 
baseline scenario outlines the most probable 
scenario, the stress scenario examines the 
consequences of a low-probability, severe but 
plausible series of events over the next two years. 
Earlier, similarly to the baseline scenario, we 
determined the stress scenario using a model. For the 
current stress test, we use a stress size based on an 
expert judgement. In the two years, economic growth 
will be 4.3 percentage points below the baseline 
scenario (Chart 72). Meanwhile, the exchange rate of 
the forint against the euro will depreciate by 15 per 
cent right at the beginning of the time horizon under 
review, and this difference will remain unchanged in 
both years. The interest rate level, i.e. domestic and 
external financing costs as well, moves 300 basis 
points upwards and remains there for the whole 
period. As a result of more severe risks and worsening 
growth outlook, companies cut pay-rolls, leading to a 
persistent deterioration in households‟ income 
position. Taking into account the pledge of the Swiss 
National Bank in relation to the exchange rate cap of 
the franc, we expect an exchange rate of EUR/CHF 
1.2 over the entire horizon. Finally, we calculate 
additional losses on outstanding non-performing 
portfolio in the adverse scenario. 
In the stress scenario, individual institutions’ 
expected income before loan losses reaches 70–100 
per cent of the average of the past three years. 
Profitability is forecasted using an econometric 
model. The profit/loss to total assets excluding one-
off effects is estimated by performing loans to total 
assets and by the product of several balance sheet 
items to total assets and their interest rates (thus: 
EURIBOR + CDS in the case of external funds, housing 
loans outstanding with the housing loan interest 
rates, household deposits with the related deposit 
rate, corporate deposits with the corporate deposit 
rates and, finally, corporate loans outstanding with 
the corporate loan interest rates). These forecasts 
were modified in certain respects on the basis of 
additional information. In the coming years, 
profitability before loan losses will be impaired by 
the substantial contraction in the household portfolio 
due to the early repayment. Moreover, this missing 
portfolio was particularly characterized by a good 
credit quality and high profitability. Therefore, in the 
stress scenario, incomes before loan losses are lower 
than the average of the previous three years, by 0–30 
per cent, depending on banks. We accounted for the 
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Chart 74: Loan loss rate in the previous four quarters for the 
household portfolio in the stress scenario 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
Table 8: Impact of main risks on the profit of the banking 
sector in the stress test, over a two-year time horizon 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
Chart 75: Market risk stress test impacts 
 
Source: MNB. 
 
 
 
entire bank levy for 2013 and half of it for 2014. We 
assumed that tax on financial transaction will be 
entirely passed on clients. 
Due to the credit portfolio deterioration, significant 
loan loss provisioning is expected in the stress 
scenario. Loan losses may stem from two sources: the 
provisioning of newly defaulted loans and additional 
provisioning on outstanding non-performing portfolio. 
In the case of corporate loans, the stress scenario 
includes a higher ratio of loan loss to total corporate 
loans than in 2009–2010, the years with the most 
severe downturn (Chart 73). However, the losses are 
lower than in 2011, a year which was considered to 
be an outlier. In the household portfolio, the 
programmes for foreign currency borrowers may 
mitigate deterioration in the coming period. Based on 
our expectations, 70 per cent of the performing 
foreign currency mortgage loan debtors may enter 
the exchange rate cap scheme, thus in their case the 
eliminated exchange rate risk needs to be taken into 
account over the forecast horizon. Accordingly, the 
probability of default (PD) and expected losses 
decline considerably in their case (Chart 74). 
In addition to corporate and household loans, 
expected losses on municipal exposures were taken 
into account as well. The loan loss provisioning 
requirement of local governments‟ exposures was 
quantified this time as well, as following the initial 
grace periods, the first principal repayments of a 
considerable portion of bonds will become due within 
our forecast period. Losses on loans and bonds were 
calculated on the basis of expert judgements (Table 
8). 
In the stress scenario, a rise in the government 
securities yields would have a significant negative 
effect on profitability. In the market risk stress test, 
we look at the impact of interest and exchange rate 
shocks through the immediate revaluation of market 
exposures. In the case of the interest and exchange 
rate shocks as well, the average difference between 
the baseline and stress scenarios was used as the size 
of the shock. The resulting profit impact was evenly 
distributed over the two-year horizon. A 300 basis 
point parallel upward shift of the yield curve results 
in a more than HUF 100 billion in losses at the 
banking sector level, mainly due to the revaluation of 
the government securities portfolio (Chart 75). In the 
stress scenario, the exchange rate depreciates by 15 
per cent, which ceteris paribus (disregarding higher 
loan losses due to portfolio deterioration) boosts the 
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Table 9: Stress test result with the 8 per cent regulatory 
capital adequacy ratio 
 
Source: MNB. 
Table 10: Stress test result with 9 per cent expected capital 
adequacy ratio 
 
Source: MNB. 
Chart 76: Factors influencing the capital adequacy ratio 
 
Note: Red columns reduce, green columns add to the value of the CAR. 
In the initial CAR we respect the major capital injections declared 
after June 2012. 
Source: MNB.  
Chart 77: Distribution of the capital adequacy ratio based on 
number of banks 
 
Note: Vertical line: 10–90 per cent range, rectangle: 25–75 per cent 
range. 
Source: MNB.  
profits of banks with foreign exchange surpluses, i.e. 
the majority of the banking sector, by approximately 
HUF 67 billion, and reduces the profits of banks with 
forint surpluses by HUF 3 billion in aggregate through 
the total open FX position. 
In the baseline scenario, as a result of massive 
capital injections by parent banks in 2011–2012 and 
steady deleveraging, every bank can meet the 
regulatory minimum level of 8 per cent (Table 9). 
At end-2011 and early this year, several domestic 
banks received capital injections from their parent 
banks to absorb the losses stemming from the 
deteriorating economic environment and the early 
repayment scheme. This fresh capital allowed banks 
to weather the losses in 2011 with adequate capital 
levels and to be able to absorb further losses. The 
capital position was further improved by a 
contraction in domestic banks‟ loans outstanding. 
Looking ahead, an already announced but not yet 
implemented capital injection and expected decline 
in loan losses at banking system level will improve the 
capital position. 
The resilience of banks’ capital position improved, 
and similarly to the previous stress test in April 
only a manageable amount of capital injection may 
be required in the stress scenario. The better 
capital position is also reflected in the results of the 
stress scenario. In the first year of the stress period, 
the banking sector would not need any capital 
injection to reach the regulatory minimum level; 
moreover, every bank would even meet the 9 per 
cent level (Table 10). As a result of a persistent 
stress, by mid-2014 banks would already need a 
capital injection, but the HUF 28 billion capital 
requirement for reaching the 8 per cent minimum 
CAR can still be considered low. 
Although aggregate capital adequacy is adequate, 
it conceals significant asymmetry. The capital 
adequacy ratio of the banking sector is robust, at 
nearly 19 per cent by the end of the two years in the 
baseline scenario (assuming no dividend payment), 
and exceeding 14 per cent even in the stress scenario 
(Chart 76). However, this seemingly favourable 
indicator conceals strong asymmetry: the capital 
adequacy ratios of individual institutions are 
dispersed in a wide range by the end of the two-year 
stress period. Furthermore, poor performers include 
one major institution as well (Chart 77). 
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Chart 78: Solvency Stress Index, and banks’ liquidity surplus or 
deficit relative to the regulatory level in the stress scenario 
 
Note: The indicator is the sum of normalised capital shortages relative 
to the 8 per cent level, weighted by the capital requirement. The 
higher the value of the index, the higher the solvency risk in the stress 
scenario. 
Source: MNB. 
The Solvency Stress Index, which provides 
comparability of stress tests over time, declined 
markedly. Using a single methodology, we prepared 
our stress test by quarters retroactively to 2005, 
which revealed changes in the resilience of the 
banking sector in terms of capital position. The index 
reached its peak in 2011 H2 due to the expected 
losses on the early repayment scheme. However, by 
end-June 2012 it sank to 6.7 per cent, i.e. below the 
average level observed during the crisis (Chart 78). In 
parallel, capital needs also show a declining trend, 
i.e. the shock-absorbing capacity of the banking 
sector improved in the past half year. The capital 
buffer also changed in a positive direction, and its 
current level is one of the highest experienced during 
the crisis. This also means that not only the capital 
position of the banking sector strengthened in terms 
of financial stability, but its lending capacity also 
improved. Nevertheless, given the low willingness to 
lend, no rapid upturn is expected in lending. 
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METHODOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF MAIN FINANCIAL STABILITY INDICES 
The current state of financial stability is evaluated using four main financial stability indices. These indices 
describe a given state; therefore, in terms of future risks to financial stability they do not always provide 
information. Accordingly, financial stability risks continue to be assessed in a qualitative manner. The index 
family may be divided into two parts: indices that measure procyclicality (FCI) and indices that measure shock-
absorbing capacity (SWFSI, LSI, ESI). The first heat diagram, which indicates the degree of procyclicality, is 
calculated on the basis of the value of the FCI, whereas the second heat diagram, which indicates the degree of 
shock-absorbing capacity, is prepared on the basis of the worst of the levels indicated by the three indices. 
The Financial Conditions Index (FCI) 
In addition to short-term interest rates and the nominal exchange rate, which represent the behaviour of money 
markets, the FCI condenses the information contained in other price, quantitative and qualitative variables 
characterising the financial intermediary system into one indicator variable. The weights of the variables that 
determine the FCI are derived from a VAR (vector autoregressive) model based on the Bayesian structural VAR 
model developed by Tamási and Világi (2010),38 as the related forecasting Bayesian VAR model family has 
become an integral part of the MNB‟s analytical portfolio by now. Therefore, it was expedient to prepare an FCI 
consistent with this tested system. 
Goodhart and Hoffman (2001) provide a good summary of the VAR-based approach.39 In order to understand the 
method, first let us assume that in terms of developments in GDP the behaviour of the financial intermediary 
sector is completely exogenous, i.e. the real economy has no feedback into the financial sector. Then, if the 
effect of financial variables on real GDP were estimated using a simple regression, simply the resulting regression 
coefficients would provide the weights for the FCI. However, the financial system and the real economy have 
simultaneous impacts on one another, so simple regression is not an adequate tool. VAR models are suitable for 
the analysis of simultaneous systems.  
The VAR model also allows for the calculation of how unexpected changes in (exogenous shocks to) individual 
financial variables affect GDP. The advantage of the method is that it is possible to exclude the endogenous 
reaction of financial variables on developments in economic activity, i.e. a real cause and effect relationship can 
be identified. As the estimated coefficients of VAR equations do not contain sufficient information as to what the 
economic content of the observed error terms (shocks) is, it is also necessary to use the estimated covariance 
matrix of the error terms to be able to interpret the shocks in an economic sense. However, even the covariance 
matrix does not contain sufficient information for the identification of economically sensible (structural) shocks, 
which requires various additional assumptions. Depending on the assumptions, there are various approaches to 
the identification of shocks. 
Goodhart and Hoffman (2001) identify the shocks on the basis of the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance 
matrix. The disadvantage of this method is that the results are not invariant to arranging the variables in a row. 
Therefore, we use the approach applied by Guichard and Turner (2008), which is based on the generalised 
impulse response concept of Pesaran and Shin (1997).40 
We estimated the model on a sample between 2001 Q1 and 2011 Q3. We used the following variables for 
estimating the VAR model: the three-month interbank interest rate (BUBOR); the nominal effective exchange 
rate; the consumer price index; real GDP; total corporate and consumer loans (including home equity loans); 
bank interest margin on corporate and consumer loans. 
The FCI gauges the impact of the financial sector on the real economy. Namely, the annual growth rate of the 
FCI shows the contribution of the financial intermediary sector (banking system) to the annual real GDP growth 
rate. Based on the FCI, the cyclical position of the banking system can also be read (Table). If the output gap is 
                                                 
38 Tamási, B. and Világi, B., 2010, Identification of Credit Supply Shocks in a Bayesian SVAR Model of the Hungarian Economy, MNB Working 
Papers 2011/7. 
39 Goodhart and Hoffman, 2010, Asset Price, Financial Conditions and the Transmission of Monetary Policy, London School of Economics. 
40Guichard and Turner, 2008, Quantifying the effect of financial conditions on US activity, OECD WP 2008/43. Pesharan and Shin, 1997, 
Generalized Impulse Response Analysis in Linear Multivariate Models, Economics Letters, 58 (January), 17–29. 
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in a negative/positive and the FCI also shows a negative/positive value, the banking system is procyclical. If the 
banking system continues to make the output gap worse, its behaviour is contractionary. Procyclicality is 
considered harmful, as in this case the financial system amplifies the economic cycle; it either overheats 
economic growth in one direction or deepens recession in the other direction. The banking system is 
countercyclical if the output gap is negative/positive, while the FCI is positive/negative. All this can be 
considered a favourable process as it stabilises economic growth and closes the output gap. If the banking system 
is countercyclical to any extent, the level indicated in the heat diagram shows the minimum. The whole scope of 
the heat diagram gauges the degree of procyclicality. 
Assessment of the procyclicality of the banking system with the different signs of the real economy cycle and 
the Financial Conditions Index 
 
The size of procyclicality is measured with the help of a historical comparison. In 2007, the excessive credit 
supply of the banking sector also contributed to the surge in foreign currency denominated mortgage loans to 
households and project loans to companies. This period is used as reference. Accordingly, in the first step, if the 
sign of the FCI is identical with that of the output gap, the banking system is procyclical. Its degree, in turn, 
depends on the relationship between the current absolute value of the FCI and the value of the FCI in 2007. If 
the former reaches or exceeds the 2007 level, it is depicted in the „heat diagram‟ as maximum risk (red zone). 
System-wide Financial Stress Index (SWFSI) 
The SWFSI measures the real-time joint stress level of the most important segments of the Hungarian financial 
system, i.e. the spot FX market, the FX swap market, the secondary market of government bonds, the unsecured 
interbank forint market, the capital market and the banking segment.41 However, in addition to allowing for the 
measurement of stress at the level of the entire financial system, it also makes is possible to quantify the extent 
to which the individual segments contribute to system-wide stress developments (i.e. those segments which drive 
system-wide stress can be identified). The value of the SWFSI changes between 0 and 1. In terms of financial 
stability, a stress level above 0.55 is considered a danger zone. Based on past experiences, at that level financial 
markets have shown considerable tensions, and the MNB also intervened to avert a more severe turmoil. SWFSI 
values of 0.55 or above means a major risk in terms of the financial system‟s shock-absorbing capacity, which 
corresponds to the uppermost domain in the „heat diagram‟. 
The Hungarian SWFSI is calculated in three steps. The first step is the selection of the so-called „raw‟ input 
variables or risk factors for each segment (which of the potentially eligible price and non-price financial 
variables capturing distinct aspects of financial stress are included in the segment-specific stress indices). The 
second step in calculating the system-wide financial stress indicator is to bring the individual raw risk factors into 
a common scale by means of appropriate transformation; the arithmetic averages over the transformed input 
variables in each segment constitute the six indices of segment-specific stress. Finally, the segment stress 
indicators are aggregated into a system-wide financial stress index guided by standard portfolio theory. 
A System-wide Financial Stress Index has to comply with two main requirements. First, it is required from a 
financial stress index to be able to identify stress events with systemic risk importance, i.e. events whose 
emergence have an adverse impact on the entire financial system and on the real economy. If the systemic 
nature of stress is ignored during the aggregation of segment stress indices into a system-wide indicator, it can 
result in higher indicated stress levels in less turbulent periods. The second factor which can affect the level of 
system-wide stress and needs to be taken into account during calculation of the system-wide stress indicator is 
the relative real economic importance (weight) of each segment. Obviously, if the stress level of a relatively 
more important financial system segment increases, the stress level of the financial system as a whole increases 
to a greater extent compared to the case when the stress level of a relatively less important segment increases 
to the same extent,  
                                                 
41Holló, D. (2012), „A System-wide Financial Stress Indicator for the Hungarian Financial System‟, MNB Occasional Papers 105. 
positive output gap negative output gap
positive FCI procyclical (expansionary) countercyclical
negative FCI countercyclical procyclical (contractionary)
  66/79 
The Hungarian System-wide Financial Stress Index is designed to capture tow aspects of systemic risk, i.e. that 
financial instability is widespread and costly for an economy. The first aspect is captured by weighting based on 
the time-varying cross-correlations among the segment stress indices, with a simple application of standard 
portfolio theory (i.e. segment stress indicators are aggregated in the same way as individual asset risks are 
aggregated into a measure of overall portfolio risk). The second element of the aggregation scheme 
characterising systemic risk is that portfolio weights are attached to each of the six segment stress indices on the 
basis of their average relative impact on industrial production (“real-impact weights”) by using simple bivariate 
macro models.  
The underlying supposition of this aggregation scheme is based on an empirically observable phenomenon, 
namely that during periods characterised by significant financial turbulence, risks in financial markets strongly 
co-move and opportunities for risk diversification narrows. This can generate further increase in risks and thus a 
rise in the financial system‟s stress level, which could also lead to the collapse of the financial system. Strong 
positive co-movement of financial market risks and the persistence of these processes may indicate the presence 
of financial stress with systemic risk importance. If the intensity of the financial market turbulence is not 
significant, the segment-specific stress indices do not move in conjunction strongly and permanently, and hence 
the turbulence-triggering event is not likely to be a stress episode with inherent systemic risk. 
The Liquidity Stress Index (LSI) 
The liquidity stress test calculation is based on a cash-flow statement reported by banks on a daily basis. The 
cash-flow statement is prepared with treasury method, meaning that it shows ceteris paribus the outgoing and 
incoming items of the bank treasury in forint and foreign exchange for thirty days following the reporting day 
(also including cash flows42 of maturing assets and liabilities as well as off-balance-sheet items). The balance of 
incoming and outgoing items is the 30-day treasury financing gap. The data provision includes the free liquidity 
reserve of the given day, which is the nostro account holding, the collateral value of eligible securities freely 
disposable at the end of the 30-day period and the sum of the deviation from the reserve requirement of the 
given month. The sum of the treasury financing gap and the liquidity reserve is the bank‟s liquidity surplus on the 
given day, which can be an indicator of the short-term liquidity shock-absorbing capacity. Of course, the liquidity 
position can be calculated for a longer than 30-day period as well, which may even lead to higher liquidity needs 
due to maturing foreign funds and swaps. However, over a longer period banks are already capable of 
adjustments, and thus the methodology described here does not provide a good estimate for liquidity risks over 
longer horizons. 
During our liquidity stress test, we always set out from the given day‟s 30-day forward looking liquidity surplus. 
In the selection of stress events, we took into account both the peculiarities of the domestic banking sector and 
the domestic and international crisis experiences of the past period. We examine the effects of five various 
shock events. The shock events can be classified into three types of risks: 1) market risk; 2) reputational risk; 3) 
counterparty risk. Using the data of the seven largest banks, we determined the size of household and corporate 
deposit withdrawals applying so-called value-at-risk based (VaR) estimates and the size of the price losses on 
eligible securities on the basis of market data. Domestic and international crisis experiences were taken as a 
basis for the degrees of other stresses. 
Degrees of stress applied in the liquidity stress test 
 
Note: The forward-looking treasury gap assumes no active treasury management on the part of the bank; hence 
it does not take into account rollovers of maturing interbank and foreign funds 
                                                 
42 The treasury gap calculation assumes that maturing interbank and foreign funds will not be renewed at all. 
Assets Liabilities
Item
Degree (per 
cent)
Currencies 
affected
Item
Degree (per 
cent)
Currencies 
affected
Default on interbank 
assets
20 HUF
Withdrawals in 
household deposits
10 HUF/FX
Exchange rate shock on 
swaps
15 FX
Withdrawals in 
corporate deposits
15 HUF/FX
Depreciation of assets 
eligible at the central 
bank
10 HUF
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The stressed liquidity surplus is calculated for each bank (due to the data availability for all banks since March 
2012, prior to that for the seven largest banks). Then an indicator between 0–1 is assigned to each bank, 
depending on the after-stress liquidity surplus as a percentage of the balance sheet total. In case liquidity 
amounts to 10 per cent as a percentage of total assets, 
as required by the regulatory authority, or higher, the 
given bank receives a value of 0. In the case of 
negative liquidity buffer, i.e. below 0 per cent, the 
bank receives a value of 1. The indicator is calculated 
linearly between the two thresholds. 
The individual indicators are weighted by banks‟ 
market shares by total assets, then the indicators are 
added up to receive the value of the LSI. In case the 
level of the index is 30 per cent or higher, liquidity risk 
is considered critical. 
For example, a 30 per cent level of the LSI means that 
a bank that has a 30 per cent market share is illiquid 
and all the others meet the regulatory minimum, or it 
can also mean that each bank is 3 percentage points 
below the 10 per cent balance sheet coverage indicator in the stress scenario. 
The Solvency Stress Index (SSI) 
The macro scenarios of our credit risk stress tests were prepared taking into account the prevailing judgement 
using the prevailing forecasting model. With the change in risk perception, the difference between the baseline 
and stress scenarios also changed from time to time. In addition, within a year the time horizons of the autumn 
and spring stress tests were also different. Accordingly, at most we could provide a qualitative assessment of the 
change in the shock-absorbing capacity of the banking system; the comparability of the findings presented in the 
Reports on Financial Stability was limited. 
For the sake of historical comparability, we prepared a so-called Solvency Stress Index (SSI), calculated with a 
uniform methodology. We prepared the stress tests retroactively to 2005 for a uniform, two-year horizon, with a 
constant degree of stress, applying the currently used models. Thus we may learn how the shock-absorbing 
capacity of the banking system has changed in recent years, and how the current state compares to the earlier 
periods.  
As the main rule, always the forecasts of the relevant Quarterly Reports on Inflation were taken as the baseline 
scenario, considering them the most probable scenario at that time. This was usually in line with market 
expectations, and was not far from realisation either. However, the economic downturn suffered in the initial 
period of the crisis considerably exceeded earlier expectations, including those of the MNB as well. If we 
evaluated the shock-absorbing capacity on the basis of the pre-crisis forecasts, we would receive a much more 
optimistic picture than the actual one. Therefore, for this period we did not take into consideration the baseline 
scenario of the inflation forecast of the MNB, but a scenario as if a considerable portion (roughly two thirds) of 
the 2009 recession could have been foreseen. Thus the related stress scenario is nearly identical with the actual 
downturn.  
In determining the stress scenarios, we always took into account the same magnitude of difference compared to 
the baseline scenario. This uniform degree of stress is similar to our earlier stress tests. The stress applied to 
each period in a uniform manner continues to be a shock that unfavourably affects Hungary‟s risk premium, the 
exchange rate of the forint and external demand, resulting in a fall in GDP, employment and domestic demand. 
 
 
0
1
-2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Stressed liquidity buffer in the share of total assets (per cent)
Calculation of individual bank liquidity indicators
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The stress measures applied in the solvency stress test 
 
The comparability of the results of our earlier stress tests was also hindered by significant methodological 
differences across different periods. In addition to methodological developments (integration of market stress 
test, introduction of additional loan loss provisioning for the non-performing portfolio in the stress scenario), the 
time horizon is also standardised, and we have decided on eight quarterly periods. We have used our latest 
models for the quantification of risk parameters as well. This model application is identical to the assumption 
that the reason for the difference between our current and older models is not due to the change in the nexus 
aimed at capturing but the fact that at present we have more precise and more detailed information about it. 
Considering the above, we have prepared the stress tests starting from 2005, on a quarterly basis. The forecast 
starting in a given quarter is always based on the closing balance sheet data of the previous quarter. The shock 
occurring in the stress scenario always occurs at the beginning of the second quarter of the forecast horizon. 
In the evaluation of the stress tests we traditionally publish many variables, but in the case of the SSI we strived 
to condense the information. We transformed the 
capital adequacy ratios by banks to the [0;1] interval in 
a way that the indicator of the bank is 1 if its capital 
adequacy ratio does not reach the 6 per cent capital 
adequacy (CAR) in the stress scenario, and 0 if its 
capital adequacy ratio reaches or exceeds 8 per cent in 
the stress scenario. In the range between 8 and 6 per 
cent the value of the bank-level indicator changes 
evenly, in line with the capital adequacy ratio. The 
upper, 8 per cent threshold value designated upon the 
determination of the bank-level indicator is the 
regulatory minimum, whereas a below 6 per cent 
capital adequacy already entails supervisory measures. 
The system-level index (SSI) is a result of creating a 
banking system level weighted average from indicators 
by banks, where the weights are the regulatory capital requirement of individual banks. A 30 per cent value of 
the index is considered a critical level; above that there is a major risk in terms of the shock-absorbing capacity 
of the banking system.  
The value of the banking system level index can also be 30 per cent if in the stress scenario the capital adequacy 
of banks that account for 30 per cent of the banking sector (in terms of capital adequacy) sinks to 6 per cent or 
below, while that of the remaining 70 per cent is 8 per cent or higher, or if the capital adequacy of 60 per cent 
of the banking sector is 7 per cent and that of the remaining 40 per cent is 8 per cent or higher. Accordingly, the 
SSI primarily provides direct information on the weighted distribution of capital shortage within the banking 
system and not on the changes in lending capacities based on capital buffers. 
 
  
Percentage point changes in GDP in 8 quarters -4,3
Percentage point changes in employment in 8 quarters -2,7
One-off permanent depreciation of the exchange rate of the forint (per cent) 15
One-off permanent interest rate shock (basis points) 300
Change in the prices of real estates for residential use - one-off, permanent (per cent) -10
0
1
-2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Capital adequacy under stress scenario (per cent)
Calculation of individual bank capital indicators
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Appendix: Macroprudential indicators 
1. Risk appetite 
Chart 1: Primary risk indicators Chart 2: Implied volatility of the primary markets 
  
Source: Datastream, JP Morgan. Source: Datastream, Bloomberg. 
Chart 3: Dresdner Kleinwort indicator  
 
 
Source: DrKW.  
2. External balance and vulnerability 
Chart 4: Net financing capacity of the main sectors and 
external equilibrium as percentage of GDP  
Chart 5: External financing requirement and its financing as 
percentage of GDP 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
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Chart 6: Net external debt as percentage of GDP Chart 7: Open FX position of the main sectors as percentage of 
GDP 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
3. Macroeconomic performance 
Chart 8: GDP growth and its main components (annual growth 
rate) 
Chart 9: Employment rate and net wage developments (annual 
growth rate) 
  
Source: KSH. Source: KSH. 
Chart 10: Use of household income as a ratio of disposable 
income 
Chart 11: Corporate real unit labour cost in the private sector 
(annual growth rate) 
  
Source: KSH, MNB. Source: KSH, MNB. 
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Chart 12: Sectoral bankruptcy rates  
 
 
Source: Opten, KSH, MNB.  
4. Monetary and financial conditions 
Chart 13: Long-term default risk and forward premium of 
Hungary 
Chart 14: Three-month EUR, USD, CHF and HUF money market 
interest rates (LIBOR and BUBOR fixing) 
  
Source: Datastream, Reuters. Source: Reuters. 
Chart 15: HUF/EUR, HUF/USD and HUF/CHF exchange rates 
compared to January 3, 2005 
Chart 16: Volatility of the HUF/EUR exchange rate 
  
Source: Reuters. Source: Reuters, MNB. 
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Chart 17: Interest rate premium of new loans to non-financial 
enterprises (over 3-month BUBOR and EURIBOR, respectively, 
3-month moving average) 
Chart 18: Interest rate premium of new HUF loans to 
households (over 3-month BUBOR) 
  
Source: MNB, Euribor. Source: MNB. 
Chart 19: FHB housing-price index (2000=100)  
 
 
Source: FHB.  
5. Prices of instruments 
Chart 20: Annualised yields on government securities’ indices 
and money markets 
Chart 21: Annual yield of key Hungarian and Central and 
Eastern European stock market indices 
  
Source: FHB. Source: ÁKK, portfolio.hu, MNB. 
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
J
a
n
-0
7
M
a
y
-0
7
S
e
p
-0
7
J
a
n
-0
8
M
a
y
-0
8
S
e
p
-0
8
J
a
n
-0
9
M
a
y
-0
9
S
e
p
-0
9
J
a
n
-1
0
M
a
y
-1
0
S
e
p
-1
0
J
a
n
-1
1
M
a
y
-1
1
S
e
p
-1
1
J
a
n
-1
2
M
a
y
-1
2
HUF loans up to 1 million EUR EUR loans up to 1 million EUR
HUF loans over 1 million EUR EUR loans over 1 million EUR
babasis point basis point
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
J
a
n
-0
5
A
p
r-
0
5
J
u
l-
0
5
O
c
t-
0
5
J
a
n
-0
6
A
p
r-
0
6
J
u
l-
0
6
O
c
t-
0
6
J
a
n
-0
7
A
p
r-
0
7
J
u
l-
0
7
O
c
t-
0
7
J
a
n
-0
8
A
p
r-
0
8
J
u
l-
0
8
O
c
t-
0
8
J
a
n
-0
9
A
p
r-
0
9
J
u
l-
0
9
O
c
t-
0
9
J
a
n
-1
0
A
p
r-
1
0
J
u
l-
1
0
O
c
t-
1
0
J
a
n
-1
1
A
p
r-
1
1
J
u
l-
1
1
O
c
t-
1
1
J
a
n
-1
2
A
p
r-
1
2
Housing loan Personal loan Home equity loan
percentage pointpercentage point
0
50
100
150
200
250
0
50
100
150
200
250
2
0
0
0
 Q
3
2
0
0
1
Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
2
Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
3
Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
4
Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
5
Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
6
Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
7
Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
8
Q
1
Q
3
2
0
0
9
Q
1
Q
3
2
0
1
0
Q
1
Q
3
2
0
1
1
Q
1
Q
3
2
0
1
2
Q
1
FHB housing-price index (nominal)
FHB housing-price index (real)
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
J
a
n
-0
4
J
u
l-
0
4
J
a
n
-0
5
J
u
l-
0
5
J
a
n
-0
6
J
u
l-
0
6
J
a
n
-0
7
J
u
l-
0
7
J
a
n
-0
8
J
u
l-
0
8
J
a
n
-0
9
J
u
l-
0
9
J
a
n
-1
0
J
u
l-
1
0
J
a
n
-1
1
J
u
l-
1
1
J
a
n
-1
2
J
u
l-
1
2
per centper cent
RMAX BUBOR (1 week) MAX
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
M
a
y
-0
5
S
e
p
-0
5
J
a
n
-0
6
A
p
r-
0
6
A
u
g
-0
6
D
e
c
-0
6
M
a
r-
0
7
J
u
l-
0
7
N
o
v
-0
7
F
e
b
-0
8
J
u
n
-0
8
O
c
t-
0
8
J
a
n
-0
9
M
a
y
-0
9
S
e
p
-0
9
D
e
c
-0
9
A
p
r-
1
0
A
u
g
-1
0
D
e
c
-1
0
M
a
r-
1
1
J
u
l-
1
1
N
o
v
-1
1
F
e
b
-1
2
J
u
n
-1
2
O
c
t-
1
2
per centper cent
BUMIX CETOP BUX
  73/79 
 
 
6. Risks of the financial intermediary system 
Chart 22: Indebtedness of non-financial enterprises as a 
percentage of GDP 
Chart 23: Denomination structure of domestic bank loans of 
non-financial enterprises 
  
Source: Eurostat, MNB. Source: MNB. 
Chart 24: Annual growth rate of loans provided to non-
financial corporations by domestic banks 
Chart 25: Net quarterly change of bank loan volumes of non-
financial enterprises 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
Chart 26: Quality of the corporate loan portfolio Chart 27: Provisioning on loans of non-financial corporations 
by industry 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
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Chart 28: Indebtedness of households in international 
comparison 
Chart 29: Debt service burden of the household sector 
  
Source: ECB, MNB. Source: MNB. 
Chart 30: Annual growth rate of total household loans Chart 31: Net quarterly change of bank loan volumes of 
households by main products and currencies, adjusted for 
exchange rate changes 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
Chart 32: Household loans distribution by denomination Chart 33: Household loans distribution by collateral 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
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Chart 34: Distribution of new housing loans by LTV Chart 35: Quality of the household loan portfolio 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
Chart 36: Comparison of instalment payments of CHF- and 
HUF- denominated housing loans 
Chart 37: Provisioning on household loans 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
Chart 38: Open FX position of the domestic banking system Chart 39: Banking sector's exchange rate exposure 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
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Chart 40: 90-day re-pricing gap of the banking sector Chart 41: Estimated maximum loss based on interest rate risk 
stress tests relative to equity 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
Chart 42: Liquidity index (exponentially weighted moving 
average) 
Chart 43: Liquidity sub-indices (exponentially weighted 
moving average) 
  
Source: MNB, Keler, Reuters, DrKW. Source: MNB, Keler, Reuters, DrKW. 
Chart 44: Bid-ask spread indices of the major domestic 
financial markets (exponentially weighted moving average) 
Chart 45: Credit to deposit ratio of the banking sector  
  
Source: MNB, Keler, Reuters, DrKW. Source: MNB. 
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Chart 46: Liquidity ratios of the banking sector Chart 47: External funds of the banking sector 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
Chart 48: ROA, ROE and real ROE of the banking sector Chart 49: Dispersion of banks' total assets by ROE 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
Chart 50: Net interest income as a proportion of the gross and 
net interest bearing assets in the banking sector 
Chart 51: Operating efficiency indicators of the banking sector 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
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Chart 52: Banks' capital adequacy ratios Chart 53: Dispersion of banks' minimum capital requirement 
by capital adequacy ratio 
  
Source: MNB. Source: MNB. 
Notes to the appendix 
The chart date (e.g. 2008) means the end of the year (the 31st of December) if it‟s not indicated otherwise. 
Chart 1: 
The increased value of the indicator indicates declining risk appetite or increasing risk aversion. 
Chart 2: 
VIX: implied volatility of S&P 500. 
MOVE: implied volatility of US Treasuries (Merrill Lynch). 
Chart 3: 
The increased value of the indicator indicates declining risk appetite or increasing risk aversion. 
Chart 4: 
General government: according to SNA methodology. 
Corporate sector and "error": the financing requirement of corporate sector is calculated as a residual, so it includes errors. 
External financing requirement: adjusted by the difference caused by imports brought forward on account of EU accession and by 
the import increasing impact generated by customs warehouses terminated due to EU accession and Gripen acquisitions. 
Chart 10:  
Disposable income is estimated by MNB using the consumption, investment and financial savings data of households. 
Chart 12:  
Number of bankruptcy proceedings of legal entities, summed according to the date of publication, cumulated for 4 quarters, 
divided by the number of legal entities operating a year before. 
Chart 13:  
The 5-year forward forint risk premium as of 5 years from now, compared to the euro forward yield (3-day moving average) and the 
5-year Hungarian credit default swap spread. 
Chart 16:  
Historic volatility: weighted historic volatility of the exchange rate (GARCH method). 
Implied volatility: implied volatility of quoted 30-day ATM FX options.  
Chart 19:  
FHB House Price Index. 
Chart 24:  
FX loans, exchange rate as of end-December 2000, HUF loans adjusted by state loan refinancing in December 2002. 
Chart 25:  
FX loans on December 2000, end of month exchange rate. 
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Chart 38:  
An increase in the swap stock stands for swaps with a long forint spot leg. Based on the daily FX reports of credit institutions. 
Calculated from swap transactions between credit institutions and non-resident investors. The MNB does not take responsibility for 
the accuracy of the data. Revisions due reporting errors and non-standard transactions can lead to significant subsequent 
modifications of the data series. The data series does not include swap transactions between branches, specialised credit 
institutions, cooperative credit institutions and non-resident investors. The swap stock is the sum of termin legs calculated at 
actual foreign exchange rates. 
Chart 41:  
The interest rate risk stress test indicates the projected result of an extreme interest rate event; in this scenario this event is a 
parallel upward shift of the yield curve by 500 basis points for the forint, and by 200 basis points for the euro, the US dollar, and 
the Swiss franc. For the calculations we applied re-pricing data and the Macaulay duration derived from them. 
Chart 42:  
A rise in the liquidity index indicates an improvement in the liquidity of the financial markets. 
Chart 43:  
Similarly to the liquidity index, increase in liquidity sub-indices suggests an improvement in the given dimension of liquidity. 
Chart 44:  
A rise in the indices represents narrowing bid-ask spread, thus an increase in the tightness and liquidity of the market. The 
liquidity index of HUF FX-swap market includes the data of USD/HUF and EUR/HUF segments, taking into account of tom-next, 
overnight and spot-next transactions. The earlier version of the liquidity index included only the tom-next USD/HUF transactions. 
Chart 45:  
Client loans include loans and bonds of non-financial institutions, household loans, loans and bonds of financial and investment 
enterprises, government loans, municipal loans and municipal bonds. Client deposits include the deposits of non-financial 
institutions, household deposits, deposits of money market funds, deposits of financial and investment enterprises, government 
deposits and municipal deposits. The loan-to deposit ratio is exchange-rate-adjusted with respect to the last period.. 
Chart 46:  
Funding gap is the difference between the exchange rate adjusted customer credit and deposit, divided by the exchange rate 
adjusted customer credit. 
Chart 48:  
ROE: pre-tax profit / average (equity - balance sheet profit). 
ROA: pre-tax profit / average total assets. 
Interim data are annualised. 
Pre-tax profit: previous 12 months. 
Average total assets: mean of previous 12 months. 
Average (equity - balance sheet profit/ loss): 12 month moving average. 
Deflator: previous year same month=100 CPI (%). 
Chart 49:  
Pre-tax profit. 
Chart 50:  
Based on aggregated individual, non-consolidated data 
Net interest income: 12-month rolling numbers, the difference of interest revenue and interest expenditure 
Gross interest bearing assets: 12-month average numbers, total exposure 
Net interest bearing assets: 12-month average numbers, exposure minus the provision 
Chart 51:  
Cost: previous 12 months 
Income: previous 12 months 
Average total asset: mean of previous 12 months 
Chart 52:  
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) = (total own funds for solvency purposes/minimum capital requirement)*8% 
Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio = (tier 1 capital after deductions/minimum capital requirement)*8% 
 
